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INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years the Supreme Court has articulated
two primary theories of employment discrimination under Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII).1 The two theories can be
analogized to two of the three prevalent doctrines of common law
tort-intentional tort and strict liability. This article sets forth the
basis, in current law and in social psychology, for a third theory of
Title VII liability, analogous to the third major doctrine of tort law-
the doctrine of negligence. My purpose is both to demonstrate that
much employment discrimination is the result of tortious acts that
are most appropriately described as negligent, and to reveal that the
existing law of employment discrimination, while eschewing the
term negligence, frequently incorporates the doctrine.
Part I of this article examines psychological and sociological data
on racism that demonstrate why discrimination is more closely
analogous to negligent conduct than it is to intentional conduct.
Drawing on the pioneering work of Charles Lawrence in The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,2 recent
studies support the assertion that most discrimination is not the
result of malice, hatred, ill will, or bigotry: it is the result of
unintended and unconscious stereotyping. Thus, a theory of
discrimination liability that focuses on intentional wrongdoing will
inevitably miss the mark; it will condemn only a small percentage of
the wrongful conduct Title VII was enacted to eliminate.
t Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University;J.D., Harvard Law
School (1978); B.A., University Without Walls/Berkeley (1972). I am extremely
grateful to Stephen Bundy andJan Vetter for their suggestions during the planning
of this article; to Erwin Chemerinsky, Marjorie Heins, Herma Hill Kay, Mary Pat
Treuthart, and Stephanie Wildman for their critiques of its several drafts; to my
research assistants Rod Fliegel, Sheryl Hahn, Ghada Saliba and Linda Sullivan, and
to my University of Pennsylvania Law Review editors, Wendy Beetlestone andJoseph
Chan, for their invaluable assistance and dedication; and to my wife Marcy Kates for
her editing, encouragement, patience, support and love.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1988). Title VII prohibits employers of 15 or more
persons from discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2a (1988).
2 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
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Part II examines the extent to which negligence doctrine is
already reflected in the law of employment discrimination. Subpart
A briefly traces the development of the two well recognized theories
of employment discrimination law under Title VII-strict liability
and intentional tort. Subpart B describes the existing incorporation
of a negligence test, termed a "less discriminatory alternative"
standard, as an alternative mode of proof within the strict liability
theory. Subpart C describes the existing duty to accommodate
religious differences, pregnancy, and physical and mental disabili-
ties,3 which is re-examined as a form of negligence law. Subpart D
describes the development of an affirmative duty imposed on
employers to prevent improper harassment of employees. The
violation of that duty is analogous to liability for the failure to
protect those with whom the actor has a "special relationship"4
under negligence law.
The conclusion sets forth a theory of negligent discrimination.
It is proposed that an employer should be found liable under Title
VII for negligent discrimination when the employer fails to take all
reasonable steps to prevent discrimination that it knows or should
know is occurring, or that it expects or should expect to occur. An
employer should also be found liable when it fails to conform its
conduct to the statutorily established standard of care by making
employment decisions that have a discriminatory effect, without first
carefully examining its processes, searching for less discriminatory
alternatives, and examining its own motives for evidence of
stereotyping.
I. UNCONSCIOUS DISCRIMINATION
A. The Theory of Unconscious Racism is Applicable to
the Problem of Employment Discrimination
In Charles Lawrence's landmark article, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,5 Lawrence
argues that:
3 Employment discrimination on the basis of disability is prohibited under the
recently enacted Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-17
(West pamphlet 1992).
4 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B (1965) (providing that
employers may be liable for failing to prevent harm to their employees).
5 Lawrence, supra note 2.
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Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions
about racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can
be characterized as neither intentional-in the sense that certain
outcomes are self-consciously sought-nor unintentional-in the
sense that the outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced
by the decisionmaker's beliefs, desires, and wishes.
6
Rather, racist acts often appear to be the product of unconscious
bias and stereotyping. Racist behavior, including employment
discrimination, can in such cases be ascribed to the failure of
decision-makers to reflect upon, and cleanse their decisions of, the
unconscious bias underlying their decisions.
Lawrence analyzes racism as a mental illness, and invokes both
the Freudian and cognitive schools of psychology to understand its
nature.7 Applying a Freudian analysis, he contends that racism
finds its source in the Id, the unconscious, and is largely inhibited
by the Ego. 8 As long as the Ego is in control, people behave in
socially acceptable ways. With regard to race, this means that
overtly racist behavior is avoided; it is suppressed. But racism may
find its way into expression through "Freudian slips," such as the
use of a racial slur when it escapes Ego censorship. 9 Or it may
remain completely out of view, yet nonetheless influence behav-
ior.
1 0
Examining racism through a cognitive analysis, Lawrence
explains that a part of a person's attempt to understand his or her
relationship to the world relies on categorizing other individuals.
11
This coping mechanism of categorization, when applied to race,
results in racial misconceptions and other stereotypes. 12  The
process tends to correlate certain groups with certain propensities;
for example, associating human intelligence, or the propensity to
violence with a particular category of people. 13 "Thus, through
personal and cultural experience the individual comes to associate
characteristics such as 'intelligence,' 'laziness,' 'honesty,' or
6 Id. at 322 (footnote omitted).
7 See id. at 322-23.
8 See Lawrence, supra note 2, at 331-32.
9 See id. at 339-40.
10 See id. at 335.
n1 See id. at 337.
12 See id.
13 See id.; see also infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text (discussing the NORC
studies and racial stereotyping in the United States).
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'dirtiness' with classifications of people."14 Since our "categoriza-
tion" of people is learned and experienced at a very young age, we
may not be conscious of having internalized those feelings and
beliefs. 15
Applying Lawrence's theory to employment discrimination,
employers who do not consciously hold racist views, but who
nonetheless discriminate in their conduct, may be viewed in
Freudian terms as having suppressed their racism, so that it operates
on their unconscious. In cognitive terms, employers may be seen
as having internalized their racism, so that it affects their decision
making without their actual knowledge. Viewed either way, if, as
asserted herein, experimental psychology reveals that unconscious
racism governs behavior among white employers who would not
consciously choose to discriminate against African Americans,
16
then their conduct cannot be explained by a search for malice or
bigotry. If those whites charged with making employment decisions
have internalized negative stereotypes about African Americans, as
the experimental data suggest, the stereotypes will be reflected in
their decisions, even if they have no desire, motivation or intent to
treat African Americans differently. Such unconscious discrimina-
tion, if prevalent, will have substantial social and legal consequenc-
es.
B. Social Science Data Support the Theory of Unconscious Racism
and Demonstrate Why Employment Discrimination
is Frequently the Result of Negligent Conduct
The theory that racial discrimination is frequently the result of
negligent, as opposed to intentional, behavior, finds considerable
support in the work of social psychologists and sociologists.
17
14 Lawrence, supra note 2, at 338-39.
15 See id. at 337-38.
16 1 use the terms "African American" and "black" interchangably, reflecting the
current common usage of both terms throughout the English language, and
particularly in the African American community.
17 1 have focused here on the data concerning race discrimination, but the same
point could be made regarding other forms of unlawful discrimination. In the area
of sex discrimination, for example, extensive data support the conclusion that sex-
based stereotyping and unconscious sexism are pervasive in American society. See
Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 471, 486-503 (1990) (discussing how sex stereotypes effect employee
evaluations); Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and
Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1764-68 (1991) (discussing more recent studies
establishing unconscious sexism); Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place:
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Surveys taken over the past fifty years demonstrate that views
expressed by whites about racial discrimination in employment have
dramatically changed, and that virtually all whites in American
society now profess a commitment to nondiscrimination in
employment. If our society mirrored the views expressed by its
white members, Title VII and other statutory prohibitions of race
discrimination in employment would be unnecessary. But the
surveys, when more closely examined, demonstrate a consistently
high level of general racial prejudice held by whites against African
Americans. Although the surveys show that the percentage of
whites openly supporting discrimination against African Americans
has dropped considerably, surveys on the implementation of civil
rights, and more sophisticated surveys attempting to measure white
stereotypes about African Americans, demonstrate extremely high
levels of covert racism. These surveys support the view that overt
racism has lost favor socially, but racist attitudes lie close beneath
the surface of our society.
1 8
Field and laboratory experiments support the conclusions of the
more sophisticated surveys, which attempt to measure stereotyping,
over those that measure overt racism; the level of racist behavior
observable in these controlled experiments is disturbingly high.
Similarly, recent attempts to test directly for racial discrimination in
employment, using controlled field experiments, also yield high
levels of discrimination.19  Given the wide variance between
expressions of overt racist principles and evidence of racist
behavior, it appears either that huge numbers of whites are falsely
denying their consciously held racist beliefs, or that many acts of
racist behavior are motivated by unconscious, rather than intention-
al, racism. If much white racist behavior is unconscious, a theory
Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REv. 345, 349-61
(1980) (discussing social science data from economists, sociologists, and social
psychologists). Similarly, the 1990 NORC study, infra notes 46-53 and accompanying
text, found that whites held negative stereotypes about Asian Americans, Hispanic
Americans, and Jews, as well as African Americans. While there is a risk of
minimizing race discrimination against African Americans by analogizing it to other
forms of discrimination, see Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the
Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism
(or Other-isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397, 399-411, the data suggest that the phenomenon
of negligent discrimination applies to all categorical discrimination prohibited by Title
VII and related nondiscrimination statutes.
18 See infra notes 20-59 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 76-84.
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that tests only for intentional discrimination necessarily misses its
mark much of the time.
1. National Polling on Racial Attitudes of Whites
Three national survey organizations have been conducting
regular polls on the racial attitudes and beliefs of white adults over
the past five decades: the National Opinion Research Center
(NORC) at the University of Chicago, the Institute for Social
Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan, and the Gallup
Organization, the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO or
Gallup). A recent comprehensive study by Howard Schuman,
Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo examines the trends exhibited
by these polls during the period 1942 through 1987.20 The data
reported in the study support the conclusion that at the level of
consciously held attitudes about African Americans, there has been
considerable progress in whites' statements of principle regarding
purely public civil rights, such as employment and public accommo-
dations discrimination. These principles, however, are not
expressed as strongly in areas of private life, such as marriage and
housing, and are in conflict with those views expressed about
support for civil rights enforcement.
2 1
In response to questions about the principle of nondiscrimina-
tion in employment, the white response indicates that overt
discrimination has lost all social acceptance. In 1944, only 45% of
the white adult NORC respondents agreed that "Negroes should
have as good a chance as white people to get any kind ofjob"; 55%
instead stated that "white people should have the first chance."
2 2
By 1963, the year before Title VII was enacted, the percentage
favoring equal opportunity had risen to 85%, and when last asked
in 1972, seven years after Title VII took effect, the number in
support of job equality had risen to a nearly unanimous 97%.23 If
those 97% of the adult white population who believe, or profess to
believe, in equal employment opportunity acted in conformance
with their beliefs, the problem of race discrimination in employ-
20 See HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 71-138 (1988).
21 See infra notes 22-45 and accompanying text.
22 SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 74-75 tbl. 3.1. Schuman reduced all of the
percentages to pro and con equaling 100%, by eliminating the undecided or
nonresponsive, except as otherwise noted. See id. at 73-77.
23 See id. at 74-75 tbl. 3.1. The question was not asked after 1972. See id.
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ment would largely disappear. But other survey results, and
experiment results, reveal a wide gap between the 97% supporting
nondiscrimination in principle and the number of whites refraining
from discrimination.
First, support for the principle of nondiscrimination in employ-
ment does not translate into support for federal enforcement of
employment discrimination laws. An ISR question asking whether
"the government in Washington [should] see to it that black people
get fair treatment in jobs or leave these matters to the states and
local communities" 24 found only 38% supporting federal enforce-
ment in 1964. By 1974, the number had declined to 36%.25 By
1986, the number had declined even further, to 83%, with another
33% stating that they had no interest in the issue and a plurality of
34% stating that the federal government should not get involved.26
This difference between white support for the principle of equal
opportunity and white support for federal enforcement of black
employment rights is dramatic. It suggests that the 97% support in
principle is an empty gesture; that true white support for equal
employment opportunity is far lower. One could theorize, however,
that the difference merely reflects fiscal concerns, or a preference
for local enforcement of civil rights over federal intervention. The
survey results on equal opportunities in housing, however, suggest
that the difference is not fiscal or procedural, but substantive; a
substantial number of whites are willing to lend abstract support to
civil rights principles, but are opposed to seeing those principles
carried out.
A disparity similar to that in employment opportunity, albeit
with substantial support for segregation still extant, was found in
the area of open housing. Forty percent of the NORC respondents
in 1963 strongly agreed that "[w]hite people have a right to keep
blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and blacks should
respect that right," and another 21% slightly agreed. 27 By 1987
the number of strong supporters had dropped to 10%, while
another 16% still slightly agreed. 28 In and of itself, 26% support
for permitting housing discrimination is strikingly high, but even
24 Id. at 88-91 tbl. 3.2 & fig. 3.4.
25 See id.
26 See id. at xii (providing additional data on trends in white attitude from 1984-
1987).2 7 Id. at 74-75 tbl. 3.1.
28 See id. at xii.
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more dramatic is the fact that many who do not support such
discrimination are nonetheless unwilling to outlaw it. In six NORC
surveys between 1973 and 1983, a significant (if declining) majority,
ranging from 66% in 1973 to 54% in 1983 have supported a
hypothetical law providing "that a homeowner can decide for
himself who to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to
blacks" over a law providing "that a homeowner cannot refuse to
sell to someone because of their race or color."29 In 1984, the
number supporting an open housing law first reached 50%,
dropping again in 1986 and rising back to 50% in 1987.0
Since government enforcement of the law was not an issue in
these survey questions, the fiscal or states' rights explanations
cannot explain the disparity between support for equality and
support for outlawing discrimination. The 50% opposition is not
opposition to government intervention; it is opposition to the
existence of a legal right to open housing. Moreover, a third series
of surveys on housing discrimination further demonstrates that this
opposition to open housing laws is substantive. Asked by ISR in
face-to-face interviews whether they would "personally prefer to live
in a neighborhood that is all white, mostly whites, mostly blacks,
mixed, [or if it made] no difference,"31 in 1976 40% of the white
respondents preferred an all white neighborhood, while 32%
preferred a mostly white neighborhood and only 28% preferred a
mixed neighborhood or felt it made no difference.3 2 It should be
apparent that "all white" neighborhoods cannot continue to exist if
open housing laws are enforced. Here again, the variance between
support of a civil rights principle and support for its implementa-
tion is substantial, and even the level of support for implementation
does not reflect the general personal preference of whites to remain
largely segregated from African Americans.
Turning to public accommodations, the response to the NORG
question asking whether people "think there should be separate
sections for Negroes in streetcars and buses"s3 again showed high
support for nondiscrimination principles, with support dropping by
42% between 1942 and 1970, although still standing at 12%.
34
29 Id. at 88-89 tbl. 3.2.
so See id. at xii.
3' Id. at 67 tbl. 2.3.
32 See id. at 66-67, 106-08 tbl. 3.3, 111-13.
33 Id. at 74.
34 See id. at 74-75 tbl. 3.1.
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Here again, the 88% support for integration of transportation did
not translate into support for civil rights enforcement, at least in the
related area of restaurant and hotel integration. When ISR
informed its subjects in 1974 that such integration was required by
law, and then asked if "the government should support the right of
black people to go to any hotel or restaurant they can afford, or
should it stay out of this matter,"35 20% replied that the govern-
ment should not enforce the law, and another 14% replied they
were uninterested in whether the law was enforced or not; only 66%
favored enforcement.
3 6
In more private areas, even civil rights principles divorced from
government enforcement find substantial white resistance. In the
area of intermarriage, as late as 1982, 34% of the NORC respon-
dents favored laws prohibiting racial intermarriage. That is, one in
three white adult Americans not only believed that marriage
between blacks and whites is wrong, but further believed that it
should be illegal. And while such laws carried 62% support in 1963,
the support had dropped to 29% in 1977 before rebounding in 1980
and 1982 to 32% and 34% respectively.3 7  By the most recent
survey in 1987, 27% still supported anti-miscegenation laws.
38
The findings were similar in response to the question "[a]re you
in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in
between?"3 9 Given the opportunity to support something other
than desegregation without supporting strict segregation, a full 60%
of white adult ISR respondents favored the "in between" category
in 1978.40 Although the number favoring strict segregation
slipped from 25% in 1964 to 5% in 1978, only 35% of the 1978
respondents favored desegregation.
41
A few surveys, most notably a series of questions asked by
NORC between 1942 and 1968, attempted to understand the source
of white racism by measuring white stereotypes about African
Americans. 42 Beginning in 1942, NORC asked, "[i]n general, do
35 Id. at 90.
36 See id. at 88-90 tbl. 3.2.
37 See id. at 74-76 tbl. 3.1.
38 See id. at xii.
39 Id.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 Important work in this area was done in the 1940s and 1950s by Gordon
Allport of Harvard. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 196-99
(1954) (noting that there exists a greater degree of consensus in the stereotypes
ascribed to African Americans than for any other group).
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you think Negroes are as intelligent as white people-that is, can
they learn things just as well if they are given the same education
and training?"43 In 1942, 53% answered that African Americans
were not as intelligent as whites. 44  By 1968, the number had
declined to a still very sizable 23%.15 But here again, 77% of the
whites who believed African Americans are as intelligent as whites
may be overstated, because the response that African Americans are
less intelligent may be recognized as now socially unacceptable even
among those whites who continue to believe it to be true.
A 1990 NORC study, conducted after the Schuman study was
published, sheds further light on racial attitudes of whites toward
African Americans in the area of intelligence and a number of other
topics in which stereotypes abound.4 6 In the 1990 NORC study,
white subjects were asked to rate various ethnic groups47 regarding
certain character traits, such as unintelligent/intelligent, hard
working/lazy, patriotic/unpatriotic, and violence-prone/not
violence-prone. The subjects were given a scale of one to seven, and
asked to place each ethnic group rated on the appropriate point of
the scale for each characteristic. Unlike the earlier polls reported
by the Schuman study, the 1990 NORC study carefully avoided
using declarative statements with which the subjects could agree or
disagree, thereby reducing the likelihood that the subjects would
censor themselves from stating socially unacceptable views. For
example, subjects were not asked the 1942-68 question "do you
think Negroes are as intelligent as white people?"4 8; they instead
were asked to generally rate whites in intelligence, and then to do
the same for blacks.
49
Four of the resulting comparisons are illustrative of the depth
and depravity of racial stereotyping in America today. Asked to rate
blacks and whites on the characteristic of intelligence, 53.2% of the
subjects rated African Americans less intelligent, with 40.5% stating
no difference. 50 On the question of hard working/lazy, 62.2% of
43 SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 118-19 tbl. 3.4.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 See ToM W. SMITH, NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CTR., ETHNIC IMAGES,
GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY TOPICAL REPORT No. 19 (1990)"[hereinafter 1990 NORC
STUDY] (examining the images whites have of various ethnic groups).
47 The groups were: Whites,Jews, Blacks, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans,
and Southern Whites. See id. at 2.
48 SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 118 tbl. 3.4.
49 See id. at 2-4.
50 See id. at 9 thl. 1.
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the subjects rated African Americans as less hard working than
whites, while 31.9% rated them equally.51 Fifty six point one
percent rated African Americans as more violence prone, with 30%
rating no difference. 52 Fifty point six percent rated African
Americans as less patriotic than whites, and 46.6% rated them
equally patriotic.53 The high numbers of whites who view African
Americans as less intelligent and less hard working than whites have
particular significance for the issue of employment discrimination,
since it is likely that employers selecting employees will choose
those they view as the most intelligent and hard working. In
addition, in matters of employee evaluation, stereotypes may
become self-fulfilling prophesies by way of suggestion; in other
words, all persons are prone to see what they expect to see. An
employer is thus likely, at the 97% level, to subscribe to a belief in
the principle of equal employment opportunity, and to articulate
that belief, yet is nonetheless more likely than not to view black
employees and applicants as less intelligent and hard working than
white employees and applicants.
This problem of stereotypes creating self-fulfilling prophesies is
well illustrated by an experiment conducted by Allport and Postman
in the 1940s. Allport and Postman showed a drawing to over forty
groups of subjects, depicting a subway train in which a black man
and a white man are standing together talking. The black man is
dressed in business clothes; the white man is wearing a T-shirt and
carrying a straight razor. The subject was asked to view the picture
briefly, and describe it to a second subject, who described it to a
third, as in the children's game "telephone." After description
through a chain of six or seven subjects, the drawing was more often
than not described as one in which a black man was holding a razor.
Often he was using it to threaten the white man.
54
Although the 1990 NORG survey, and earlier surveys on
implementation of civil rights laws, disclose an extremely high level
of white racism, one obvious problem with survey data is the risk
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO PosTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 111
(1947) (relating the experiment and describing it as an example "of the impact of
cultural expectations on perception"); see also ELIZABETH F. LOFTus, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY, 38-39 (1979) ("In over half of the experiments ... the [black] mant...
is said to hold the razor ... [sometimes] reported as brandishing it ... or as
threatening the white man with it.").
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that the respondents are not being truthful in their answers. As
high as the numbers are, the disparity between the questions on
principle and those on implementation suggests that survey results
generally may underestimate the true level of white racism because
of the concern by respondents not to appear racist. If overt racism
is socially unacceptable behavior, persons being surveyed, even
anonymously, may be reluctant to reveal their true beliefs. This is
borne out by a series of experiments conducted in the 1970s in
which white subjects were polled regarding their views on African
Americans, with half hooked up to a device (a "bogus pipeline") that
was described as a sophisticated lie detector.55  The subjects
attached to the bogus pipeline admitted holding far more negative
stereotypes than did those merely asked to rate racial characteristics.
For example, Sigall and Page describe the subjects hooked up to the
device as describing African Americans as less "honest" and
"intelligent" and more "lazy," "stupid," and "physically dirty" than
did those subjects not hooked up to the bogus pipeline.5 6 (Both
groups of whites, those hooked up and those not hooked up to the
machine, rated African Americans negatively as compared to
whites.) 57 Allen demonstrated that whites who had been rated as
"unprejudiced" in a paper test on racial attitudes showed a
significant reduction of expressed admiration of black public figures
when hooked up to the bogus pipeline. 58 Carver's study is particu-
larly relevant to employment discrimination. The subjects were
asked to characterize a fellow student based on a transcript of an
55 See Harold Sigall & Richard Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading A Little
Faking, 18 J. PERSONALIT & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247, 250-54 (1971) (reporting that
respondents hooked up to the bogus pipeline were more likely to assign negative
stereotypes to African Americans); see also Bern P. Allen, Social Distance and
Admiration Reactions of "Unprejudiced" Whites, 43J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 709,
717-23 (1975) (describing the methodology and results of the bogus pipeline studies);
Charles S. Carver et al., Favorable Evaluations of Blacks and the Handicapped: Positive
Prejudice, Unconscious Denia or Social Desirability?, 8J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 99
(1978) (using the bogus pipeline technique to test reactions to African Americans and
to the handicapped); Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White
Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 546, 559 (1980)
(describing the studies and discussing the major findings of the bogus pipeline
results).
56 See Sigall & Page, supra note 55, at 250-51.
57 See id.
58 See Allen, supra note 55, at 717-23 tbl. 4 ("Experiment IV"). In a paper and
pencil test, the "unprejudiced" whites rated the black public figures higher than a
matched set of white public figures. Once hooked to the machine, they rated the
white public figures higher than the black public figures.
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interview. The transcripts were identical, save that half identified
the interviewee as African American. Those not hooked up to the
bogus pipeline actually gave the black student a higher rating than
the student whose race was not identified, but those persuaded by
the operation of the machine that their "true feelings" were being
measured, rated the black student significantly lower than the
other.59 These results suggest a high level of dissembling by many
survey participants, and raise the question of whether even the data
revealed in the more subtle 1990 NORC survey understate the true
level of white racism.
2. Unobtrusive Studies of Racial Attitudes of Whites
One response to the limitations of survey data has been to
design experiments that measure behavior, rather than attitude.
Such tests can both ferret out conscious racism which the subject
would prefer not to admit-as in the bogus pipeline experiments-
and reveal unconscious racism, which may be unknown to the
subject. In 1980, Crosby, Bromley, and Saxe examined a large
number 60 of field experiments conducted since the mid-1960s
which attempted to test for the presence of racism by testing for the
presence of discriminatory behavior. These experiments attempt to
observe white subjects in an interracial situation where their
conduct, if uninfluenced by racism, would be expected to be similar
to their conduct with other whites. The results present strong
evidence that the reduction in racist views expressed in surveys does
not foretell a corresponding reduction in racist behavior.
Thirty of the studies reviewed by Crosby were "helping behavior
studies" in which white subjects were faced with people (half of
whom were white, half of whom were black) posing as needing
assistance. For example, in a number of studies a person posing as
a shopper would appear to drop a bag of groceries; the study
measured whether white passers-by were more likely to help if the
person in need was white or black.61 In other studies, a person
59 See Carver, supra note 55, at 101-03.
60 Crosby selected 46 such studies which utilized "unobtrusive" experiments-
experiments in which subjects are not aware that they are being studied, or not aware
that the study is examining the subject of discrimination. Crosby, supra note 55, at
546-47.
61 See, e.g., Lauren G. Wispe & Harold B. Freshley, Race Sex, and Sympathetic
Helping Behavior: The Broken Bag Caper, 17J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 59, 62-65
(1971) (measuring differences in the helpingbehavior of men and women and finding
that "there were no significant differences between blacks and whites in help given
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would pose as a motorist in distress to measure whether white
drivers were more likely to help blacks or whites.62 In Crosby's
analysis of these thirty experiments, she found that in 40% of the
studies, white subjects showed discriminatory behavior against
blacks.
63
High as it is, this 40% measure of discrimination may be
understated due to the social scientists' conservative analysis of what
constitutes nondiscrimination. For example, Wispe concluded that
the white subjects showed no discrimination in their willingness to
help the shoppers whose bags broke.6 4 However, in her analysis
of the Wispe shopping bag experiment, Crosby notes, while whites
and blacks were offered assistance in equal numbers, the amount of
assistance offered was not equal. 65 Rather, 63% of the time that
white subjects were aiding white women, the subjects gave complete
help, picking up all of the groceries. But 70% of the time white
subjects helped black women, they gave only perfunctory help,
picking up only a few packages. 66 When complete help and
perfunctory help are distinguished, Wispe's study, which concludes
that there was no showing of racial differences in helping behavior,
demonstrates that whites are exactly twice as likely to help other
whites as they are African Americans.
67
In most of the helping behavior studies analyzed by Crosby, the
subject was engaged in a face to face encounter with the person
needing help. But in eight of the thirty studies, the encounter was
remote, generally by telephone. In comparing the face to face
experiments with the remote experiments, Crosby found that in
32% of the face to face studies there was white discrimination
against blacks, while in 75% of the remote studies there was such
or received"). Crosby, however, noted that Wispe's analysis of the shopping bag
experiment did not measure the amount of help received by whites and blacks,
Crosby found that the amount of assistance offered to blacks and whites was
significantly different. See Crosby, supra note 55, at 549; infra notes 64-67 and
accompanying text.
62 See, e.g., Stephen G. West et al., Helping a Motorist in Distress: The Effects of Sex,
Race and Neighborhood, 31 J. PERSONAIJTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 691, 693-94 (1975)
(describing the method of their emergency motorist study and finding that the
subjects were helped primarily by people of their own race).
63 See Crosby, supra note 55, at 549, 550-52 tbl. 1.
6 See Wispe, supra note 61, at 64-65.
65 See Crosby, supra note 55, at 549.
66 See Wispe, supra note 61, at 62 tbl. 1; see also Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns
of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 673, 688-89
(1985).
67 See Wispe, supra note 61, at 62 tbl. 1 (white subject/positive help).
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discrimination. 68 This disparity supports the view that when
engaging in public activity, whites may be more careful to avoid
discriminating, but when acting privately or anonymously, many
whites will discriminate against African Americans. One particular
study which supports this analysis was especially striking. An
envelope containing a completed graduate school application was
left at an airport phone booth. The application contained a
stamped, addressed envelope for submission to the graduate school,
a note to "Dad" asking him to please mail the application, and, as
part of the application, a photograph of the candidate. White adults
were observed picking up the application in the phone booth and
inspecting it. They were found to be significantly more likely to
mail the application when the applicant was white than when the
applicant was black. 69 Crosby theorized that white helping behav-
ior was more prevalent in face to face encounters because "whites
today hold prejudiced attitudes but that they inhibit expression of
this prejudice when the possibility of negative consequences is great.
In the more removed and anonymous situations (Type 2), discrimi-
nation is much more likely to emerge."
70
In addition to the helping behavior studies, another set of
studies examined by Crosby measured nonverbal behavior to test for
racism. Each of the four experiments in this group found measur-
able white racism.71 For example, in one experiment white male
students at Princeton were asked to interview a white or black high
school student.7 2  The interviewees were trained participants
(confederates), instructed to behave in a like fashion. As Crosby
reports "the subjects sat further away from the black confederates
than from the white confederates, made more speech errors when
talking to the blacks than when talking to the whites, and terminat-
ed the black interviews sooner than the white interviews. In short,
a marked degree of nonverbal discriminatory behavior was ob-
tained."73
68 See Crosby, supra note 55, at 549, 559 tbl. 2.
69 See Peter L. Benson et al., Pretty Pleases: The Effects of Physical Attractiveness,
Race, and Sex on Receiving Help, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYcHOL. 409, 413-14
(1976).
70 Crosby, supra note 55, at 549.
71 See id. at 555-56.
72 See Carl 0. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfiling Prophecies in
Interracial Interaction, lOJ. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 112-15 (1974).
7 Crosby, supra note 55, at 555.
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A laboratory study from 1976 demonstrated the impact of racial
stereotyping on perception. 74 White undergraduates viewed a
videotape on a monitor in which one participant shoved another.
When the person doing the shoving was black, the subjects
described the shove as violent, but when the person doing the
shoving was white, it was described as harmless "playing around."7 5
3. Experimental Field Tests Of Employment Discrimination
In one recent experiment, a direct measure of race discrimina-
tion in employment was obtained. The test, conducted by the
Urban Institute, used white and black job-seekers to measure the
difference in treatment of qualified employment candidates by
employers advertising for employees. 76 The Urban Institute study
carefully matched the employment-related characteristics of ten
pairs of young men. In each pair, one man was black, one was
white. Each applied for entry-level jobs advertised in newspapers in
Washington, D.C. and Chicago during the summer of 1990. A total
of 476 tests, termed "audits," were conducted. The study found that
in 15% of the audits the white job-seeker was offered ajob while his
black counterpart was not; in 5% of the tests the black job-seeker
was favored. 77 In our nation's capitol, whites were favored with
job offers 19% of the time, African Americans 6%.78 Thus, overall,
a white job-seeker was substantially more likely to be offered entry
level employment than an equally qualified black job-seeker.
Moreover, in 20% of the audits, the white job-seeker progressed
further in the hiring process than his black counterpart; in 7%, the
black job-seeker progressed further.79 Thus, even where there was
ultimately no job offer, there was significant discrimination against
the black applicant. And, whites were positively "steered," directed
74 See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perceptions and Attribution of Intergroup
Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 590, 590-94 (1976).
75 See Crosby, supra note 55, at 556; supra text accompanying note 54.
76 See MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES
DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING (1991). An earlier study by the
Urban Institute testing for employment discrimination against Hispanics reported
similar results. See HARRY CROSS ET AL., EMPLOYER HIRING PRACTICES: DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT OF HISPANIC AND ANGLOJOB SEEKERS 61 (1990) (finding that "Hispanics
... face considerable barriers compared to their Anglo counterparts in obtaining
interviews and offers of employment for low-skilled, entry-level jobs").
77 See TURNER, supra note 76, at 39 tbl. 4.2.
78 See id. at 41 tbl. 4.4.
79 See id. at 39 tbl. 4.1.
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to better paying jobs, 5% of the time, while African Americans were
steered 3% of the time.
80
Although the Urban Institute auditors were instructed to push
forward with their applications unless or until they were either
offered or denied the job, many job-seekers will be discouraged
from pursuing an employment application by their treatment in the
hiring process. It is thus significant that in 8% of the Washington,
D.C. audits, the black auditor was given greater discouragement
from applying than was his white counterpart, while in another 6%
of the audits, the white auditor was given greater encourage-
ment." For those 45% of the audits where both auditors received
interviews, in 50% of the interviews, the white auditor was favored
compared to the black auditor in waiting time, length of interview,
number of interviewers, positive comments, or negative comments;
in 27%, the black auditor was favored. 2 For example, "a black
auditor reported that he had received a very discouraging impres-
sion of the job, including the statement that 'your supervisor will
work your butt off.' The white partner, on the other hand, was told
that the company offered great opportunities for advancement."83
The discriminatory results were not uniform across all job catego-
ries. In general, African Americans were more likely to encounter
unfavorable treatment in higher paying, higher status jobs and in
jobs involving substantial customer contact.
8 4
C. The Problem of Unconscious Racism Demands the Solution of
Negligence Liability for Unconscious Employment Discrimination
Comparing the experimental data to the survey results on racism
yields a number of conclusions. From the surveys alone, it is clear
that while few whites admit to holding overtly racist principles,
particularly in the area of equal employment opportunity, racism
remains a potent force in white attitudes about African Americans.
When surveys are designed to reduce the phenomenon of false
negatives from participants reluctant to admit their racist beliefs,
the level of white racism that emerges is even higher.8 5 And when
80 See id. at 43 tbl. 4.5.
81 See id. at 45-46 tbl. 4.6. Notably, in Chicago the black auditors were favored
over their white counterparts and given more encouragement 5% of the time.
82 See id. at 4548 tbl. 4.7.
83 Id. at 4849.
8 See id. at 52-53.
85 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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experiments test for observed racist behavior, the results are higher
than even these more sophisticated survey results would predict.8 6
One possible explanation is that survey participants are dissembling
at a very high level. This explanation, if true, is itself highly
significant in examining the problem of employment discrimination
litigation: if whites routinely lie in order to avoid admitting holding
racist views, then white testimony regarding the reasons for
employment decisions ought to be subjected to a high degree of
skepticism. Another explanation, however, far more compatible
with the experimental data, is particularly relevant to a theory of
negligent discrimination. This explanation is that whites are
frequently simply unaware of their own racism.
If whites are frequently unaware of their own racism, a theory
of employment discrimination that focuses on an intent to discrimi-
nate provides no remedy for most discrimination. Yet the victims
of unconscious discrimination have suffered the same economic
damages, and often the same emotional damages, as the victims of
knowing bigotry. The nature of the wrong committed by the
employer who decides not to hire.African Americans, or women, or
members of ethnic or religious minority groups, because of a self-
acknowledged prejudice, may be greater than that of the employer
who is merely unaware of his own propensities, but the harm caused
by the unconscious discrimination is largely the same. Intentional,
bigoted decisions may be appropriately the subject not only of
compensatory but of punitive damages as well, and thus properly
distinguished. But the primary problem of employment discrimina-
tion should be focused on determining liability, and assessing
proper damages, where most discrimination occurs, at the level of
unconscious discrimination.
Our understanding of Title VII's prohibition of employment
discrimination should thus include a view of employment discrimi-
nation that distinguishes those cases involving intentional discrimi-
nation from those involving unconscious discrimination. Distin-
guishing between conscious and unconscious discrimination will
help employees and employers alike. Employees would be able to
prove liability where racism or other prohibited factors have played
a substantial role in an adverse employment decision, whether or
not the employer was cognizant of his motives. Employers would be
86 See supra Part I.B.2-B.3.
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able to avoid the social stigma of a finding of discrimination where
they intended no harm.
A system in which discrimination is analyzed under a theory of
strict liability or intentional tort, rather than negligence, leaves little
room for recognition of unconscious discrimination. Although
Supreme Court decisions analyzing Title VII purport to endorse
only the strict liability and intentional tort theories, a close
examination reveals substantial support for a theory of negligent
discrimination.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION INCORPORATES NEGLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND
INVITES THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT THEORY OF
NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION
Few commentators have discussed Title VII as creating a tort
action,87 and the two Supreme Court decisions in which the
question has been addressed have been rendered obsolete by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.88 In Curtis v. Loether,89 the Court con-
sidered the availability of jury trials in housing discrimination cases
brought under another civil rights law, Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968.90 It found that because Title VIII provided for actual
and punitive damages, it created a cause of action analogous to a
common law tort action. The Court contrasted the remedies
available under Title VIII with those available under Title VII,
noting that Title VII remedies were limited to back pay and other
equitable relief.9 1 Title VII remedies, the Court reasoned, were not
the kind of damages which constituted legal, as opposed to
equitable, relief. Thus, with reference to the difference in the
nature of the available damages, Title VIII was construed as creating
a tort cause of action with ajury trial available. The Court did not
reach the question of whether Title VII permitted a jury trial, but
suggested by its reasoning that it did not because it was insufficient-
ly tort-like.
87 Such a discussion is, however, set forth in some detail, and criticized in Alfred
W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 100-06 (1972), and more recently in
Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 761-65 (1991).
88 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
2000e).
89 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
90 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
91 See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196-97.
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The damages distinction between Title VII and Title VIII was
erased with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.92 Under
the new Act, plaintiffs may be awarded unlimited actual and
punitive damages in race discrimination cases, and up to $800,000
in sex discrimination cases.93 The implications of this change were
noted by the Court in its recent decision in United States v. Burke.
94
Burke concerned the question of whether a settlement or award in
a Title VII case was excludable from gross income under the Tax
Code's exclusion for personal injury awards. The Court concluded
that the decisive question was whether Title VII created a cause of
action in tort or in contract, because damages in employment
contract cases constitute taxable income while tort damages are
excludable. The Court determined that prior to the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, Title VII monetary damages were limited to wages and
were therefore fully taxable. The Court noted its implicit recogni-
tion, however, that damages received after passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 would be treated differently because "the
amended act signals a marked change in [Congress'] conception of
the injury redressable by Title VII."95 Thus, while the Court has
not yet explicitly held that Title VII cases should now be analyzed
as tort cases, such a holding is implicitly compelled.
Turning from the explicit decisions of the Court, and the
arguments of commentators, the analogy of Title VII to other
employment torts is obvious. The central purpose of Title VII is to
right the wrong created by discrimination, and to make its victims
whole by permitting a civil action for damages. Although the source
of this cause of action is an act of Congress, rather than the
common law,96 the action is, like any other tort action, an action
to redress a civil wrong, not based on contract, for which damages
are sought. Examination of the theories under which Title VII
actions may be brought reveals that the Court has clearly recognized
Title VII as providing tort-like actions under theories of intentional
92 105 Stat. at 1071.
93 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(3) (West Supp. 1992).
94 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
95 Id. at 1874 n.12. Since the plaintiffs received their damages prior to the
adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, this new "conception" was not "imported
back" into Title VII analysis. Accordingly, the Court held that the back pay awards
were not excludable from gross income. See id.
96 See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 563-64 (Cal. 1968) (holding that
tort actions may arise from common law development or through legislative creation
of civil wrongs).
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tort and strict liability, while implicitly recognizing a wide range of
inchoate negligence theories.
A. The Court's Early Analysis of Employment Discrimination
Cases Established Two Tort Theories of Liability-
Intentional Discrimination and Strict Liability
When Congress enacted Title VII it provided little guidance on
the standard that courts should require for proof of discrimination.
The Supreme Court's two earliest decisions interpreting Title VII
resolved this issue97 by requiring an intent test equivalent to the
standard of proof for intentional torts in one branch of cases,
98
while permitting a strict liability test similar to that used in strict
liability in tort in a second area.99 Generally, the Court provided
that where an employee challenges policies or procedures which
have a discriminatory effect, she may rely on a strict liability theory,
rather than having to prove intentional discrimination.100 This
doctrine is variously referred to as the "effects test," 10 1 the "dispa-
rate impact" theory,10 2 and "adverse impact analysis."103  In
contrast, where an employee challenges a specific employment
decision, she must prove it was motivated by an intent to discrimi-
nate. 104  This doctrine is generally described as the "intent
9 7 The resolution provided and described herein has been the subject of
considerable recent controversy. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (holding that the burden of proving discrimination, even in an
adverse impact case, remains with the plaintiff at all times, and that the employer
need only produce evidence of "legitimate business reasons" for its employment
practices); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994, 997-98 (1988)
(laying the foundation, with four Justices for the majority opinion in Wards Cove).
Wards Cove was thereafter overturned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e). See infra text
accompanying notes 155-64.
98 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); infra text
accompanying notes 117-23.
9 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); infra text accompanying
notes 109-16.
'00 See id. at 432.
101 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,618 (1983) (Marshal,J.,
dissenting).
102 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 338 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
10- Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
104 See infra text accompanying notes 117-23.
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test," 10 5 the "discriminatory motive test,"10 6 the "disparate treat-
ment" theory,107 and "adverse treatment" analysis.
10 8
1. Strict Liability
The strict liability approach is found in the Court's first Title VII
case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 10 9 where the Court considered what
standard of proof was required to establish that an employer's job
screening procedures violated the Act. Prior to the passage of Title
VII, Duke Power Company had openly segregated its employees at
its Draper, North Carolina power plant. Black workers were only
hired into the "labor department," where even the highest wages
were below the lowest wages of the other departments. On July 2,
1965, the date Title VII became effective, the company added a new
requirement for employment in any department other than the
labor department-achievement of passing scores on two profession-
ally prepared "aptitude" tests.110  Transfers out of the labor
department were restricted to employees who had either passed the
two tests or who had completed high school.
Thirteen of the fourteen African Americans employed at the
plant filed a Title VII action challenging the new requirements,
which prevented them from transferring into other, higher paying,
departments. The trial court concluded that the Act required proof
of discriminatory intent, and that the company did not have a
subjective discriminatory purpose in adopting the high school
degree or test requirement.1 1 ' On appeal, the plaintiffs argued
that even absent discriminatory intent, hiring or transfer require-
ments which produced discriminatory consequences were prohibited
unless the requirements were job related. The Fifth Circuit rejected
the argument, affirming the District Court judgment that a
105 United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1558 n.17 (11th
Cir), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 237 n.8 (5th Cir.
1978) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48
(1976)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980).
106 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
107 Id.; Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 501-02 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989).
109 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
110 The tests were the Wonderlic Personnel Test (a "general intelligence" test) and
the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. See id. at 428.
'11 See id. at 428.
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subjective test of employer intent should govern Title VII ac-
tions. 1
12
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice
Burger, reversed. The Court concluded that Congress was primarily
concerned with the effect of employment practices rather than with
employers' intent. As Chief Justice Burger explained: "Congress
directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation."113 Without specifically
using the term "strict liability," the Court adopted a strict liability
test for selection devices that had a discriminatory impact. If a
practice could be shown to disproportionally exclude a group
protected by the Act, it was discriminatory without regard to the
employer's intent. The employer was, in effect, strictly liable for its
unintended but harmful conduct.
While establishing a strict liability test for discriminatory
selection devices, the Court simultaneously fashioned an affirmative
defense-the defense of business necessity.11 4  The employer
could justify its selection device, despite its discriminatory impact,
by showing that it was necessary to the essential operation of the
business. But the burden of proving the affirmative defense of
business necessity was substantial; the employer was given "the
burden of showing that any given requirement [having a discrimina-
tory impact] must have a manifest relationship to the employment
in question."115
The availability of this adverse impact/strict liability theory
helped make it possible for employees to bring broad-based charges
challenging systemic discrimination that could never have been
proved in individual, intentional tort type cases. The potential cost
to employers was substantial.116 The existence of the affirmative
defense of business necessity tempered that potential cost by
relieving employers of liability for their discriminatory practices
when they could demonstrate that their businesses simply could not
continue to operate absent their unintended discrimination.
112 See id. at 428-29.
113 Id. at 432.
114 See id. at 431.
115 Id. at 432.
116 See, e.g., Neil C. Churchill &John K. Shank, Affirmative Action and Guilt-Edged
Goals, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1976, at 111 (describing large lawsuits and
settlements).
1993]
922 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:899
2. Intentional Tort
Because the Griggs test was concerned with a systemic type of
discrimination, such as an employment selection device, it was
generally invoked in class action cases on behalf of all those affected
by the challenged practice. It was initially seen as having little
application to cases in which an individual was challenging a
particular decision depriving her of ajob or an equal employment
opportunity. Such individual cases were analyzed by comparing the
treatment of the complaining employee with that of non-minority
employees, in order to discern from the difference in treatment a
wrongful motive, and were described as "disparate treatment" cases.
The standard of proof in disparate treatment cases was addressed
in the Supreme Court's second Title VII case, McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.
117
In the McDonnell Douglas case, Green, a black civil rights activist,
claimed that he had been rejected by McDonnell Douglas for ajob
as a mechanic both because of his race and because he had been a
vocal public opponent of McDonnell Douglas' past employment
practices, which he alleged were racially discriminatory."
l 8
McDonnell Douglas responded that it had rejected Green because
he had engaged in illegal acts against the company.
119
The Supreme Court held that in an individual discrimination
case there must be proof of an intent to discriminate. The Court
made it clear that the intent could be proven through circumstantial
rather than direct evidence; there was no need to have the employer
admit a discriminatory motive. If the plaintiff could show, for
example, that she120 was qualified for an open job which remained
open after her rejection, the employer must articulate a nondiscrim-
inatory reason for its decision. 12 1 If the employer articulated a
nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff could establish that the
117 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
118 See id. at 794. Discrimination against an applicant or employee because of her
opposition to practices made unlawful by Title VII is itself a violation of the Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988).
119 The acts were a "stall-in" and a "lock-in" used to disrupt the plant and
dramatize the dispute over hiring and employment practices. See McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 794-96.
120 Although the McDonnell Douglas decision involved race discrimination, the
Court has since held that the test generally applies in any type of Title VII
discriminatory treatment case. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 252 (1981).
121 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION
proffered reason was unworthy of belief, thus reviving the circum-
stantial evidence of discrimination as unrebutted. 122 In contrast to
a discriminatory impact case, in the case of an individual challeng-
ing a specific decision, a conscious intent to discriminate was the
touchstone. Although the Court has made it clear that there are a
wide variety of ways of establishing circumstantial proof of a
discriminatory intent, it has continually reaffirmed that in the
disparate treatment case, the wrong prohibited by Title VII is an
intentional wrong requiring proof in some form of a conscious
discriminatory motive. That wrong, at its core, is an intentional
tort-an intentional wrongful interference with the rights of another
person.
123
To some degree, where employers have knowingly applied
stereotypes 124 to assess an employee or applicant, the Court has
permitted the finding of intent to rely on the use of the stereotypes,
even if the intent was thus indirect. But the Court has required that
the stereotypes be proved to have been "consciously" and "knowing-
ly" applied. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins125 the Court held that
evidence that an employer knowingly applied sexual stereotyping in
a promotional decision may be used to infer an intent to discrimi-
nate. Hopkins was a senior manager for Price Waterhouse who was
denied promotion to partnership.1 26 Her work for the firm was
highly regarded, but her interpersonal relations with colleagues and
staff were controversial.1 27 As Justice Brennan explained in the
plurality opinion:
There were clear signs, though, that some of the partners
reacted negatively to Hopkins' personality because she was a
woman. One partner described her as "macho"; another suggested
that she "overcompensated for being a woman"; a third advised
122 See id. at 804-05; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 ("[The plaintiff] must have
the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for
the employment decision.").
123 See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 8, at 36 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that the concern of intentional tort is intent
to act in a manner which invades the interest of another in a way that the law
forbids).
124 On the application of stereotypes as a form of sex discrimination in
employment, see generally Taub, supra note 17.
25 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
126 Technically, under Price Waterhouse's procedures she was initially proposed
for partnership, with the decision deferred, and then not reproposed. See id. at 231-
32.
127 See id. at 233-35.
19931
924 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:899
her to take "a course at charm school" .... But it was the man
who, as Judge Gesell found, bore responsibility for explaining to
Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board's decision to place her
candidacy on hold who delivered the coup de grace: in order to
improve her chances for partnership, [he] advised, Hopkins should
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more feminine-
ly, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."
128
The district court determined that although there were
legitimate complaints about Hopkins' interpersonal skills, and that
these were not utilized as a pretext for discrimination, that some of
the partners participating in the partnership vote had been
influenced by sex-stereotyping, or gender-biased views of appropri-
ate workplace demeanor, 129 and that the firm had discriminated
against Hopkins "by consciously giving credence and effect to
partners' comments that resulted from sex stereotyping. " 13° As
to this portion of the district court decision, the court of ap-
peals13 1 and Supreme Court affirmed.
132
Injustice Brennan's plurality opinion, the Court held that the
evidence that the employer knowingly considered evaluations
motivated by stereotypical notions about women was sufficient to
support the finding that sex discrimination improperly played a role
in the employment decision. 133  This is a step removed from a
direct discriminatory motive, but it nonetheless depends on a form
of constructive intent, or inferred intent.134 Although the Court
could have reached the conclusion that the employer's gender
stereotyping was a violation of the employee's right to an individual-
ized nondiscriminatory determination, and thus, in essence a form
128 Id. at 235 (citations omitted).
129 See id. at 236.
'
3 0 Id. at 237.
131 See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
132 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 255-58. Another portion of Hopkins,
concerning the question ofwhether an employer could escape liability if it had mixed
motives for its decision, was overturned by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C.A
§ 2000e-2(m) (West Supp. 1992).
133 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-52. Justice Brennan pointed out that it
does not "require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed
'interpersonal skills' can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick,
perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the
criticism." Id. at 256.
134 For other cases in which intent was inferred from conduct, see Barbano v.
Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1990); Blake v.J.C. Penney Co., 894 F.2d
274, 278 (8th Cir. 1990); Perry v. Kunz, 878 F.2d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1989); Brooks
v. Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061, 1063 (8th Cir. 1988).
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of negligence, it chose instead to reaffirm the importance of
discriminatory motive as the touchstone of intentional discrimina-
tion.
Without explicitly using tort language, the Court explained the
intentional tort/strict liability distinction in InternationalBrotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States:
13 5
"Disparate treatment" such as alleged in the present case is the
most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations
be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from
claims that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employ-
ment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof
of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a
disparate-impact theory.
136
3. Watson, Wards Cove, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act-
the Abandonment and Rebirth of Strict Liability
At the very heart of the Griggs strict liability doctrine was the
absence of malice; liability did not carry with it any conclusion
about fault, or wrongdoing. But beginning in 1977 the Court
attempted to move its adverse impact analysis away from strict
liability. At the core of the Rehnquist Court's view of adverse
impact discrimination was proof of fault; in the process, formerly
strict liability cases were subjected to an intentional discrimination
test. The response was the congressional passage of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act. That Act revived strict liability analysis, and, as will be
discussed in Part II.B.3, gave new life to negligence analysis as well.
The attempt to abandon strict liability began with the decision
in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,137 where the Court consid-
ered the question of whether adverse impact analysis could be
properly applied to the use of subjective evaluations in promotion
decisions. Watson, a black woman, had applied on four occasions
135 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
136 Id. at 335 n.15 (citations omitted).
137 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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for promotions from her job as a bank teller. In each case she was
rejected in favor of a white candidate. The bank had no formal
criteria for evaluating candidates for the positions she sought,
instead relying on the subjective evaluations of the supervisors who
knew the candidates. All of the supervisors evaluating Watson were
white.138 At least one of those supervisors commented that the
"position was a big responsibility with 'a lot of money ... for blacks
to have to count. '"' 13 9 In the district court, Watson attempted to
use both intentional discrimination and adverse impact theories of
liability, but the district court concluded that in an individual case
focusing on specific decisions only the McDonnell Douglas intentional
discrimination analysis could be applied, and that Watson had failed
to prove an intent to discriminate. 140  The Fifth Circuit
affirmed.
14 1
Justice O'Connor authored an opinion which was in part a
majority opinion and in part a lead opinion by an evenly split Court,
explaining for four of the eight participating justices how the
decision should be applied. 14 2 All eight participating members
agreed that subjective hiring or promotion criteria could be
properly subjected to adverse impact analysis. 143 But in so doing,
four members144 attempted to redefine the underlying premise of
adverse impact cases.
Justice O'Connor's opinion began by discussing the theoretical
underpinnings of adverse impact analysis. Moving away from the
clear line drawn in Teamsters between adverse treatment and adverse
impact cases, 14 5 the opinion stated:
The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically
dominate in disparate impact cases do not imply that the ultimate
138 See id. at 982.
139 Id. at 990.
140 See id. at 983-84.
141 See id. at 984 (affirming the district court holding that plaintiff had failed to
prove her claim, but vacating the portions of the judgment affecting other members
of the black job applicant class so as to avoid inequitable preclusion).
142 Parts I, II-A, II-B, and III were joined by all members of the Court except
Justice Kennedy, who took no part in the decision, and Justice Stevens, who wrote
separately, concurring only in thejudgment. See id. at 982, 1000, 1011. Parts II.C
and II.D were joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia; on
those partsJustice Blackmun authored a separate opinionjoined byJustices Brennan
and Marshall. See id. at 982, 1000.
143 See id. at 989-91, 1011.
144 Chief'Justice Rehnquist andJustices O'Connor, White and Scalia.
145 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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legal issue is different than in cases where disparate treatment
analysis is used. Nor do we think it is appropriate to hold a
defendant liable for unintentional discrimination on the basis of
less evidence than is required to prove intentional discrimination.
Rather, the necessary premise of the disparate impact approach is
that some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately
discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent
to intentional discrimination.
146
This analysis of unintended adverse impact discrimination as
"functionally equivalent" to intentional discrimination appeared to
mark a dramatic deviation from Teamsters. The decision appears to
suggest that all discrimination must be intentional to be wrongful,
and that the adverse impact test is simply an alternative means of
finding discriminatory intent.
This reading becomes critical in considering the portion of the
opinion which did not command a majority. There, Justice
O'Connor went on to discuss the need for new evidentiary stan-
dards to be applied in adverse impact cases.147 She explained
that permitting adverse impact challenges to subjective selection
practices created a substantial risk that many employers would be
subjected to liability merely because their workforce failed to
precisely mirror the available labor pool. If such a statistical
showing required an employer to prove a manifest relationship
between the subjective selection process and the employment in
question, many employers would face the risk of enormous liability.
Faced with such liability, Justice O'Connor feared that employers
would instead utilize illegal hiring quotas designed to avoid any
appearance of discrimination:
If quotas and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective
means of avoiding expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic
liability, such measures will be widely adopted. The prudent
employer will be careful to ensure that its programs are discussed
in euphemistic terms, but will be equally careful to ensure that the
quotas are met.
148
In order to avoid this risk that easy proof of discrimination
would lead to the use of improper quotas, Justice O'Connor called
for two "constraints that operate to keep that [adverse impact]
146 Watson, 487 U.S. at 987 (citation omitted).
147 See id. at 991.
148 Id. at 993.
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analysis within its proper bounds."149 The first was a requirement
that the plaintiff identify the specific practice causing the discrimi-
natory impact, rather than generally challenge the bottom line
results of the employer's screening. "[T]he plaintiff is in our view
responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical
disparities. Cf. Connecticut v. Teal."150 Thus, if an employer used
a series of screening devices to choose employees, and the end
result was the elimination of women or minorities from the
candidates chosen, the plaintiff challenging the selection process
would bear the burden of proving which of the screening devices
used was discriminatory.
As a second constraint,Justice O'Connor recommended revising
the business necessity defense by shifting the burden of proof from
the defendant to the plaintiff.1 5 1 She did so by again blurring the
line between the Griggs and McDonnell Douglas lines of cases.
1 52
Under the Griggs formulation, business necessity operated as an
affirmative defense; the burden of persuasion was placed squarely
on the defendant. Once the plaintiff had established that the
selection device had a discriminatory impact, the employer was
required to "prove" 155 business necessity. By contrast, in the
McDonnell Douglas intentional discrimination cases, once the
plaintiff established a prima facie case the burden of production
shifted to the defendant, but the burden of persuasion remained
with the plaintiff.154 The articulation of a nondiscriminatory
149 Id. at 994.
150 Id. (citation omitted). The citation to Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982),
borders on irony. In Teal, the Court held that an employer must use the business
necessity defense to justify each discriminatory step in a selection process, rather than
rely on having achieved a nondiscriminatory ultimate result. See id., 457 U.S. at 443-
45. Requiring the plaintiff to identify the point in the selection process where the
employer's conduct produced the discriminatory result turns Teal on its head.
151 See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994.
152 See Watson, 487 U.S. at 1001-02 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
153 Dothard v. Rawlingson, 433 U.S. 321,329 (1977) ("[T]he employer must meet
'the burden of showing that any given requirement [has]... a manifest relationship
to the employment in question.'" (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
432 (1971))); Albemarle v. Paper Co., 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (stating that under
Griggs, an employer can rebut the plaintiff's showing by proving its employment
criteria to be job related); see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
670 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen an employer is faced with sufficient
proof of disparate impact, its only recourse is to justify the practice by explaining why
it is necessary to the operation of business."); Watson, 487 U.S. at 1001 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
15 See Texas Dep't of CommunityAffairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254-56 (1981);
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reason was merely a method of dispelling the plaintiff's prima facie
showing, not an affirmative defense. Thus, the articulation of a
nondiscriminatory reason in an intentional discrimination case was
relatively easy, while the proof of business necessity in a strict
liability/adverse impact case was quite difficult. Using the
McDonnell Douglas formulation to justify shifting the plaintiff's
burden under a Griggs analysis substantially undermined the
analytical differences between the two lines of cases. It was a
precursor of the major development of the following term.
The Watson Court's blurring of intentional and strict liability
discrimination only commanded four votes in 1988. In 1989, it
gained a decisive fifth vote in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.155
Wards Cove and a second company operated salmon canneries in
Alaska. Each employed two classes of workers: "cannery workers,"
who held unskilled fish packing positions, and "noncannery
workers," who held mostly skilled and semi-skilled positions.
Cannery workers were hired through a predominantly Filipino
union local in Seattle and through recruitment in Alaskan Indian
villages; most were non-white. Noncannery workers were hired
through other offices in Oregon and Washington; most were white.
Hiring preferences were accorded to former employees and their
family members. The workers' accommodations were segregated by
job category. Noncannery workers had separate and apparently
superior dorms and dining halls, and were virtually all paid more
than cannery workers. The companies did not permit cannery
workers to apply for promotion into noncanneryjobs. A group of
non-white cannery workers brought an action challenging, in part,
the separate hiring channels, the nepotism, and the practice of not
promoting from within.'
56
When the case reached the Supreme Court, 157 a new five
member majority led by Justice White adopted the O'Connor
positions from Watson that the plaintiff must prove which specific
practice caused the discriminatory effect,158 and that the business
see also Watson, 487 U.S. at 1001-02 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
155 490 U.S. at 644. Justice White wrote for a five member majority; he wasjoined
by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. See id.
156 See id. at 647-48.
157 The district court ruled in favor of the companies. See id. at 648. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, but then reversed following an en banc hearing. See id. The
Supreme Court reversed the circuit court. See id. at 661.
158 See id. at 656 (holding that the plaintiff must identify which particular practice
is discriminatory).
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necessity defense is not a burden of proof-shifting affirmative
defense.1 59 The Wards Cove majority dropped the Court's prior
description of business necessity and instituted a new test. Instead
of requiring the employer to prove a "manifest relationship to the
employment in question," 16° the Court required only that the
employer produce evidence (but not prove) that the "challenged
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals
of the employer."161 Abandoning the language of necessity, the
Court held that the employer need only articulate how the practice
serves its goals; "there is no requirement that the challenged
practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business
for it to pass muster."162 Relying on Watson, and its blurring of
the distinction between the proof of intentional discrimination and
adverse impact/strict liability cases, the Court pointed to the
McDonnell Douglas line of cases to assert that in all discrimination
cases the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all
times. "[T]he employer carries the burden of producing evidence
of a business justification for his employment practice. The burden
of persuasion, however, remains with the disparate-impact plain-
tiff."
163
By placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff throughout the
adverse impact case, by changing the business necessity defense to
a legitimate business goals defense, and by blurring the distinction
between adverse impact and intentional discrimination, the Court
effectively attempted to retreat from a strict liability standard to a
fault standard. Its retreat failed only through legislative interven-
tion in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. That Act restored
the law to its pre-Wards Cove form:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if... a complaining party
demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity
164
159 See id. at 659 (holding that the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff).
160 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
161 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (citations omitted).
162 id.
163 Id.
164 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
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B. The Origins of Negligent Employment Discrimination: The Less
Discriminatory Alternative as a Negligence Alternate Within
the Doctrine of Strict Liability Discrimination
1. The Development Of The Less Discriminatory Alternative Test
Despite the clear dichotomy suggested by Teamsters in footnote
fifteen,165 the Court had by then already begun to articulate a
third approach to discrimination within the adverse impact/strict
liability doctrine-the less discriminatory alternative doctrine. This
doctrine was first articulated in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 16
6
In Albemarle, a class of black employees sued their employer, a
paper mill. Like the Duke Power Company, the Albemarle Paper
Company strictly segregated its workers prior to the passage of Title
VII, with black employees restricted to the lowest paying positions.
When Title VII became effective, the company instituted a seniority
system that prevented employees who were transferring to new jobs
from taking their seniority with them, and required transferring
employees to hold a high school degree and take two "aptitude"
tests.167 The Supreme Court affirmed a holding that the seniority
system was discriminatory and reversed a decision that the aptitude
tests were job related. 168 The Court reasoned, in dicta, that if the
employee proved that the employer's selection device had a
discriminatory impact, and the employer then met its burden by
validating its procedures under the business necessity test, the
employee could nonetheless prevail if she could "show that other
tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial
effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest."169
The employer's failure to use the less discriminatory selection
device was itself a violation of Title VII. 170 This test came to be
165 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977); supra note 136 and accompanying text.
166 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
167 See id. at 409-11.
168 See id. at 435-36.
169 Id. at 425.
170 Many of the circuit courts applied the Albemarle dicta. See Mozee v. American
Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1050 (7th Cir. 1991); Nash v. Consol.
Jacksonville, 837 F.2d 1534, 1536 (11th Cir. 1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 1103 (1989),
reinstated, 905 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 967 (1991); Clady v.
County of L.A., 770 F.2d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109
(1986); EEOC v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 743 F.2d 739, 742 (10th Cir. 1984); Walker v.
Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554, 1559 (l1th Cir. 1984); Zuniga v. Kleberg
County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1982); Clanton v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd.,
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known as the "alternative selection " 171 test or "less discriminatory
alternative" 172 test.
2. The Relationship of the Less Discriminatory Alternative
Test to the Doctrine of Negligence
The formulation of a less discriminatory alternative test
encourages the consideration of a negligence theory of employment
discrimination. Negligence, at its core, is the breach of a duty
recognized by law for the protection of others.1 73 Such a duty, or
obligation to conform to a minimum standard of conduct, may be
determined through the development of the common law, or by
legislative action, or administrative regulation.174 In the employ-
ment context, such duties and obligations include providing a
physically safe workplace, 175 protecting employees from unfit co-
employees and supervisors, 176 and refraining from terminations
which violate public policy.177 The relationship between the
employee and employer may be described as a "special relation-
ship," requiring a greater responsibility from the employer, vis-a-vis
649 F.2d 1084, 1098 (5th Cir. 1981); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, 645 F.2d
1251, 1263 (6th Cir. 1981); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1015 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619
F.2d 1178, 1186-87 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980); see also Easley v.
Anheuser-Busch Inc., 572 F. Supp. 402, 410 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (finding that an
alternative selection procedure was available), modified, 758 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1985).
171 See, e.g., Clady, 770 F.2d at 1428 ("The plaintiff then may attempt to rebut the
defendant's evidence by showing that although job-related, the test does not
constitute a business necessity because an alternative selection device exists which
would have comparable business utility and less adverse impact." (citation omitted)).
172 See Mozee, 940 F.2d at 1050; Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 992; Clanton, 649 F.2d at 1098.
173 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 123, § 30.
174 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965).
175 See, e.g., Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that an employer has an obligation to provide a safe workplace, and that
terminating an employee for complaints about workplace safety is tortious).
176 See, e.g., Najera v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (Ct. App. 1961)
(permitting tort action by employee against employer for "negligent retention" of a
dangerous co-employee).
177 See, eg., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 376-80 (Cal. 1988)
(holding that termination in violation of public policy is tortious);Tamenyv. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330,1336-37 (Cal. 1980) (holding that discharge of employee
for refusing to participate in illegal price-fixing scheme is tortious).
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the employee, than the general duties persons have toward others.
178
Tort actions arising from this special relationship are often
premised on the employer's knowledge of a risk of harm, or of a
less potentially harmful way to accomplish some task.179 The law
of negligence requires persons who choose to become employers to
enter into the employment relationship with care, in order to
protect those persons seeking employment, those who become
employed, and the general public. When a failure to exercise due
care in the manner of choosing employees, or maintaining or
terminating their employment, causes harm, the employer is
responsible for the costs of that harm.
The Albemarle test can be best understood when it is examined
in light of the duties of one in a special relationship. To put Griggs
and Albemarle in the more common tort usage, Title VII establishes
a duty on the part of employers not to discriminate.180 Under the
Griggs line of authority, that duty includes a duty not to adopt or
use selection devices that have a discriminatory impact, unless
manifestly necessary to the operations of the business. Under
Albemarle, where the selection device's discriminatory impact is
conditionally privileged under the business necessity defense, the
employer nonetheless has a further duty to determine whether a less
discriminatory alternative that meets its legitimate needs exists.
Where there is a less discriminatory alternative, the failure to adopt
the less discriminatory device renders the employer liable to those
harmed by the use of the more discriminatory device. Liability is
established because the employer could have provided greater
protection against discrimination without sacrificing its legitimate
and necessary business interests. If a less discriminatory alternative
exists, the employer has failed to act reasonably-it has breached its
duty of care-by engaging in avoidable discrimination.
Like all tests of reasonableness, a balance lies at the heart of the
standard. On one side lies that which the employer knew or should
have known about the relative risks of harm in the various available
selection devices. On the other side lies the employer's necessary
business practices. Where the plaintiff proves that the employer's
selection of the more discriminatory device cannot be justified by
reference to the employer's necessary and legitimate interests, the
employer has been shown to have breached its duty not to discrimi-
178 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B (1965).
179 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 123, § 33, at 201-02.
180 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285(b), 286 (1965).
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nate. The employer's liability is not the result of an intent to
discriminate, nor is the employer strictly liable. Rather, the
employer is liable because it breached a duty to avoid discriminatory
consequences by failing to adopt a less discriminatory alternative
where such an alternative was available. The employer's actions are
negligent, and it is thus liable under Title VII.
3. The Death and Re-birth of the Less Discriminatory
Alternative Test: Wards Cove and The 1991 Civil Rights Act
The Court in Wards Cove, having laid waste to the Griggs
doctrine of strict liability, also went on to eviscerate the Albemarle
less discriminatory alternative theory. The Court noted with
approval the long-standing Albemarle principle that if a selection
device meets the business necessity test, the plaintiff may still
prevail by showing that a less discriminatory selection device would
also serve the employer's legitimate interests. But the Court
dramatically altered the effect of a finding that an employer had
failed to adopt a less discriminatory alternative. Under Albemarle
and its progeny, the employer's failure to adopt the less discrimina-
tory alternative was sufficient to prove a violation of the Act. In
Wards Cove, the Court held that if the plaintiff proved that the
employer had failed to adopt a less discriminatory alternative, the
employer could escape all liability merely by agreeing, at that time,
to adopt the less discriminatory procedure. In essence, the
employer was free to ignore a less discriminatory selection device
until the plaintiff's case was proven at trial. Only then did the
employer face the choice of changing its discriminatory policy or
incurring liability. The Court reasoned that in the face of proof at
trial of both a discriminatory impact and a less discriminatory
alternative, an employer's failure to adopt such less discriminatory
alternatives would constitute evidence of pretext, belying the claim
that the discriminatory selection device was being employed for
nondiscriminatory reasons.181 The Court either failed to consid-
er, or was unswayed by the problem, that if there was no cost in
choosing the more discriminatory alternative, there would be no
incentive to choose the less discriminatory alternative. Under the
Wards Cove rule, an employer had no reason to choose a less
discriminatory selection device over a more discriminatory device
until a law suit had proceeded all the way to trial, at which point all
181 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660-61 (1989).
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liability could then be avoided by the simple expedient of changing
policies.
This effective abandonment of the less discriminatory alternative
test, however, met the same fate as the Court's attempt to abandon
the Griggs test. The 1991 Civil Rights Act has restored the doctrine,
providing that an unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under Title VII if the complaining party
demonstrates the existence of a less discriminatory alternative
employment practice, in accordance with the law as it existed on
June 4, 1989, the day before182 Wards Cove was decided on June
5, 1989.183 Thus, the existence of a negligence-like approach,
within the general theory of the adverse impact theory of discrimi-
nation, has been approved by the Congress, and is explicitly a part
of Title VII. This Congressional ratification demonstrates that, if
discriminatory alternatives are available, employers are liable under
Title VII for adopting discriminatory tests, even if the tests serve
legitimate business interests. Wholly aside from the Griggs strict
liability approach, employers are also liable for the harm caused to
women or minority applicants if they adopt a selection device which
is discriminatory in its effects when the risk of such a discriminatory
result could have been avoided by using a less harmful selection
device. Following the passage of the new Act and the reinstitution
of the Griggs test, the employer must establish both business
necessity and the absence of a less discriminatory alternative. Even
if the selection device meets the business necessity test, if the
employer knew or should have known of a less discriminatory device
that met its legitimate needs, it should have avoided the harm
caused to women and minorities by using the less discriminatory
device. By acting carelessly or unreasonably in choosing the less
discriminatory device, the employer has harmed the women and
minority applicants, as well as the society as a whole. An intent to
cause the harm may not have been present, but in passing Title VII
the Congress was concerned with the consequences of discrimina-
tion, not simply the motivation.
Underlying the Congressional focus on the consequences of
discrimination, as opposed to discriminatory intent, may be an
implicit recognition of the existence of unconscious discrimination,
and its importance in the analysis of Title VII cases. If Congress, in
182 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)-2(k)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1992).
183 See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 642.
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1964 and again in 1991, were merely concerned with the intentional
tort model of employment discrimination, it would have either
disavowed Griggs or failed to pass the 1991 Act. But Congress
clearly concluded that intentional discrimination was only part of
the problem. In approving the Griggs and Albemarle tests, the 1991
Act recognizes that the problem of employment discrimination is far
broader than the problem of intentional wrongdoing; it extends to
the negligent adoption of a selection device which has a discrimina-
tory impact not required by business necessity, and the negligent
adoption of a discriminatory device which may be justified by
business necessity but is not the least discriminatory alternative. If
motive were the touchstone of all discrimination, the Court's
disavowal of the unintentional discrimination tests would have been
sustained by Congress. Underlying these tests is the recognition
that employers may act out of motives that are not consciously
discriminatory, but are either unconscious of discrimination, or are
unconsciously discriminatory.
C. The Duty to Accommodate Differences: The Origins
of Liability for Failing to Act
In Teamsters, the Court's attempt to describe all employment
discrimination as coming within the Griggs or McDonnell Douglas
approaches to discrimination failed to consider a third branch of
discrimination analysis-liability for the failure to prevent discrimina-
tion from occurring. This basis of liability has its roots in those
cases in which an employer was charged with failing to accommo-
date an employee's protected status, such as her religion, pregnan-
cy, or disability. At its heart, this-theory too is essentially based on
negligence; the employer is liable not because of a discriminatory
act, but because of its failure to comply with a duty to take certain
actions to reasonably protect its employees and applicants. The
recognition of a duty to accommodate certain differences further
demonstrates that a theory of negligent discrimination is already
firmly rooted in Title VII.
1. Accommodation of Religious Practices
Title VII, as originally enacted, was silent regarding the nature
of the duty not to discriminate based on religion. It simply
provided that employers could not "fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
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privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... reli-
gion."
184
In 1966, the EEOC adopted guidelines which interpreted the Act
to require an intent to discriminate, but simultaneously provided
that employers be required to accommodate the religious beliefs
and practices of their employees. Regarding intent, the guidelines
provided that an employer:
may prescribe the normal work week and foreseeable overtime
requirements, and, absent an intent on the part of the employer
to discriminate on religious grounds, ajob applicant or employee
who accepted the job knowing or having reason to believe that
such requirements would conflict with his religious obligations is
not entitled to demand any alteration in such requirements to
accommodate his religious needs.'
8 5
Alongside this requirement that a complaining employee prove
an intent to discriminate, the guidelines further provided that "the
duty not to discriminate on religious grounds includes an obligation
on the part of the employer to accommodate the reasonable
religious needs of employees.., where such accommodation can be
made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the busi-
ness."
18 6
Just one year later, in 1967, the EEOC modified its guidelines to
provide that "the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds...
includes an obligation on the part of the employer to make
reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees and
prospective employees where such accommodations can be made
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's busi-
ness." 187 The 1967 guideline contained two significant amend-
ments to the 1966 version. First, employers were no longer
required to accommodate the "reasonable religious needs of
employees," 188 but to make "reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of employees." 189 Second, the language premising
184 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 1988).
185 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b)(3) (1967).
1s6 Id. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967).
187 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1968).
188 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967).
1s9 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1968). This corrective amendment avoided whatwould
otherwise have been a serious First Amendment entanglement problem, in which
courts would be required to determine not the reasonableness of a requested
accommodation, but instead the reasonableness of a religious practice. Under such
a standard, for example, a court might be required to determine whether it was
reasonable for Moslems andJews to refrain from eating pork, or forJews and Seventh
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liability on an intent to discriminate was completely removed from
the guideline; the duty of reasonable accommodation applied to all
employment decisions having an impact on an employees' religious
practices. Thus, under the 1967 guidelines, the EEOC recognized
that discrimination had a broader meaning than traditional adverse
treatment; treating people the same when their religious practices
required them to be treated differently constituted unlawful
discrimination.
The nature of the duty to accommodate was first tested in Dewey
v. Reynolds Metals Co.' 90 Dewey, a member of the Faith Reformed
Church, was discharged when he refused to work overtime on
Sunday because it interfered with his religious beliefs. The district
court adopted the EEOC guidelines as a proper interpretation of
the statutory ban on religious discrimination and found that because
Reynolds failed to either reasonably accommodate Dewey's religious
beliefs or demonstrate undue hardship, Reynolds had discriminated
against Dewey on the basis of religion. The Sixth Circuit reversed
and found that the district court had improperly applied the 1967
version of EEOC guideline section 1605.1 retroactively. The court
stated that the 1966 guideline should have been applied. Moreover,
the Sixth Circuit held that Reynolds could also avoid liability under
the 1967 guideline because it reasonably accommodated Dewey's
religious practices by permitting him to find replacements for his
Sunday shifts. 191
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held oral argument.
In a per curiam opinion, an equally divided Court affirmed the
Sixth Circuit's determination. 192 As argued by the parties and
amici curiae, 193 the critical issue was whether Title VII could
properly be interpreted to require any duty of accommodation, and,
if so, the extent of that duty.
In response to Dewey, Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to
explicitly require reasonable accommodation: "[t]he term 'religion'
includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
Day Adventists to celebrate the Sabbath from Friday to Saturday.
190 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd,
402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam).
191 See Dewey, 429 F.2d at 331.
192 See Dewey, 402 U.S. at 689.
193 Appearing in support of affirmance was the United States Chamber of
Commerce. Appearing to urge reversal were the United States, the NationaJewish
Commission on Law and Public Affairs, and the AmericanJewish Congress. See id.
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reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship
on the conduct of the employer's business." 194 The statutory duty
to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious practices was
subsequently upheld by the Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison 195 and Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook.
196
Although the Court has not used the language of negligence in
upholding the statutory duty to accommodate, the core concept is
nonetheless present. In requiring employers to reasonably
accommodate employee's religious practices, employers are held to
a duty of reasonable care. It is not enough that they treat all
persons equally to avoid liability for discrimination, they must take
affirmative protective steps to treat certain employees differently
and better. An employer's benign neglect in the face of a proper
request for accommodation results in liability, not because the
employer has engaged in an intentional wrong, but because it has
failed to conform its conduct with that which is statutorily deter-
mined to be the behavior of a reasonable employer.
2. Accommodation of Pregnancy
A second area in which the duty to accommodate has become an
important aspect of Title VII analysis is that of pregnancy discrimi-
nation. The Supreme Court first addressed such discrimination
under Title VII19 7 in 1976 in Gilbert v. General Electric Co.198
Gilbert, a General Electric employee, became pregnant and sought
a paid disability leave under the company's disability plan. Her
claim was denied because the plan covered all nonoccupational
sicknesses and accidents except for disabilities arising from
pregnancy, miscarriage, or childbirth.
Gilbert filed a Title VII action asserting that the exclusion of
pregnancy benefits constituted sex discrimination. The district
court ruled in her favor, holding that the exclusion was prohibited
sex discrimination. 199 The Fourth Circuit affirmed.200  The Su-
194 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
195 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
196 479 U.S. 60, 63 & n.1 (1986).
197 The Court had addressed the issue under the Constitution in Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), a case in which the Court held that a state unemployment
disability program that excludes coverage for disability resulting from pregnancy does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
198 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
199 See Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 386 (E.D. Va. 1974), affd,
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preme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Rehnquist, held
that General Electric's benefits plan did not violate Title VII.
20 1
The Court reasoned that General Electric's plan was nondiscrimina-
tory because "there is no risk from which men are protected and
women are not... [and] no risk from which women are protected
and men are not."20 2 In other words, the plan excluded pregnant
men, as well as pregnant women, without regard for their genderl
The Court further held that the exclusion of pregnancy from the
benefits plan could not be judged a pretext for intentional discrimi-
nation against women because, although confined to women,
pregnancy is significantly different from the other covered disabili-
ties.
203
In response to Gilbert, Congress amended Title VII to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1978 (PDA).20 4 The PDA added the following
subsection to Title VII:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include ...
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, ... shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work
205
The Congressional purpose of the PDA was to restore the interpre-
tation of Title VII to protect all persons from sex discrimination,
including pregnant women, as it stood before Gilbert.2 °6
In the aftermath of Gilbert and the PDA, debate arose concern-
ing whether pregnant women should be given "equal treatment" or
"special accommodations" in the workplace. To the extent that it
defines discrimination, the PDA appears to set forth an equal
treatment approach; pregnant women were to be treated the same
as nonpregnant people with similar working abilities. Some argued
519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
200 See Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S.
125 (1976).
201 See Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
202 Id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
203 See id. at 136.
204 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (1988)).
205 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
206 See 124 CONG. REC. 21,436 (1978); 123 CONG. REC. 10,581, 29,387, 29,647,
29,655 (1977).
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that the equal treatment approach was necessary, and that special
accommodations for pregnant workers would erode equal opportu-
nity for women in the workplace because any special treatment
would open the door to inequalities in workplace rights.20 7
Others argued that the biological differences between the sexes
should be recognized. Pregnancy should be accommodated because
pregnant women experience special needs, and a failure to make
special provisions for pregnant workers will create employment
barriers for the increasing number of women in the workplace who
must leave from time to time for pregnancy and birth.08 As
Justice O'Connor has described it:
The dilemma is this: If society does not recognize the fact that
only women can bear children, then "equal treatment" ends up
being unequal. On the other hand, if society recognizes pregnancy
as requiring special solicitude, it is a slippery slope back to the
protectionist legislation that barred women from the
workplace.... [S]ometimes to treat men and women exactly the
same is to treat them differently, at least with respect to pregnan-
cy.
Women do have the gift of bearing children, a gift that needs
to be accommodated in the working world. However, in allowing
for this difference, we must always remember that we risk a return
to the myth of the "true woman" that blocked the career paths of
many generations of women.20 9
In 1980, the California legislature adopted the special treatment
view, providing that pregnant workers were entitled to an unpaid
pregnancy disability leave of up to four months, and that the failure
to so accommodate an employee's pregnancy constituted sex
discrimination. 210 In an important extension of the concept of
207 See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325,327 (1984-
85) (advocating the equal treatment model in order to avoid creating "structural
barriers to the full participation of women in the workforce").
208 See, e.g., Herma H. Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 22-27 (1985) (arguing that reproductive differences
between men and women should be recognized during the "temporary episode of a
woman's pregnancy"); Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J.
375, 436 (1980-81) ("To account for pregnancy... [is] to treat women as equals...
by ceasing to impose on women a bifurcated existence ... and to restore to women
the opportunity to ... integrate[] [a] career and procreation just as... men [do].
209 Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, Address at the James Madison Lecture
at New York University School of Law, THE RECORDER, Dec. 20, 1991, at 6, 13-14.
210 See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12945 (West 1992).
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discrimination as a failure to accommodate an employee's protected
differences, the Supreme Court upheld California's law against a
challenge under Title VII in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra.
21 1
In January, 1982, Lillian Garland, a receptionist at California
Federal Savings and Loan Association ("Cal-Fed"), took a pregnancy
disability leave. While on leave, Cal-Fed filled her position with a
permanent replacement. In April, Garland notified Cal-Fed that she
was ready to resume work, but was told that no appropriate
positions were available. California's Department of Fair Employ-
ment and Housing, on behalf of Garland, alleged that Cal-Fed's
disability leave policy violated California law. As the State began an
administrative prosecution, Cal-Fed sought a declaration in the
United States District Court that the California law violated Title VII
by requiring employers to discriminate in favor of pregnant
employees on the basis of sex.
The district court agreed, striking down the California law as
providing preferential treatment of female employees inconsistent
with Title VII's equal treatment purpose.2 12 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the PDA was intended to require employers
to include pregnancy disability leave in benefit packages. Because
pregnancy disability leave furthers Title VII's purpose of achieving
equal employment opportunity, the California law was held
permissible under Title VII.
213
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, affirmed
the Ninth Circuit's decision, holding that California could provide
special accommodation to pregnant employees because Title VII
and the California law shared a common goal of equal employment
opportunity. By requiring reinstatement after a reasonable
pregnancy leave, the California law promotes nondiscrimination on
the basis of pregnancy and "allows women, as well as men, to have
families without losing their jobs."
21 4
The Court's position was a significant endorsement of a theory
of negligent discrimination. The wrong committed under California
law was the failure to take special steps, not taken for male workers,
211 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
212 See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, No. CIV.A.83-4972R, 1984 WL
943, at *4-*5 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985), affid, 479 U.S. 272
(1987).
213 See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir.
1985), aftd, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
214 Guerra, 479 U.S. at 289.
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to ensure female workers' continuing employment. Liability was
assessed not because of an act directed at Garland, but instead
because of the failure to accommodate her pregnancy. This focus
on liability for the failure to take an affirmative action is a classic
example of liability for the failure to carry out a duty imposed by a
special relationship. The Court's holding that the PDA did not
foreclose the California negligence approach to pregnancy discrimi-
nation, focusing on the employer's reasonableness and its obligation
to act to prevent harm to its employees, is consistent with the
actions of Congress in each case where it has moved to expand a
Title VII theory that was previously narrowed by the Court; in the
cases of Gilbert, Dewey, Griggs, and Albemarle, Congress has acted to
protect a negligence analysis of employment discrimination or to
recognize that discrimination need not be intentional to be
wrongful.
3. Accommodation of Disabilities
The theory of discrimination by a failure to provide reasonable
accommodation also finds support in the area of discrimination on
the basis of physical or mental disability. The Rehabilitation Act of
1973 prohibits the federal government, federal agencies, federal
programs and private employers who receive federal financial
assistance from discriminating in various areas, including employ-
ment, on the basis of disability.215  Administrative regula-
tions216 and court interpretations217 require employers covered
under the Rehabilitation Act to reasonably accommodate the
disabilities of employees.
This requirement of accommodation has recently been congres-
sionally recognized and expanded. OnJuly 26, 1990, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) was signed into law.218 The ADA
applies to most employers, 219 not just recipients of federal assis-
215 See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
216 See e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1991) (requiring recipients of federal funds to
reasonably accommodate applicants or employees with disabilities).
217 See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985) (stating that a grantee
covered by the Rehabilitation Act may be required to make "reasonable" modifica-
tions to accommodate the disabled).
218 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1990).
219 The ADA exempts employers with fewer than 25 employees for the first two
years that the Act is in effect, and those with fewer than 15 employees thereafter. See
id. § 12111(5)(A).
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tance.220  It provides that employers must make reasonable
accommodations to qualified individuals with a disability, unless the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on business
operations.2 2 1 The ADA defines reasonable accommodation to
include:
making existing facilities ... readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and []job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustments or modifications of examinations, training materials
or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and
other similar accommodations .... 222
Here again, an employer may be subjected to liability not
because of any affirmative or intentionally discriminatory steps it
has taken, but instead because it has failed to act affirmatively to
protect employees or applicants from harm when it had a duty to do
so. Liability cannot be explained under a theory of intentional
wrong, nor of strict liability. The analogous common law tort is
negligence.
D. The Development of the Duty to Prevent Harassment
The conventional view of discrimination law recognizes either
two or three theories of employment discrimination: adverse
impact, intentional disparate treatment, and, in some cases, failure
of accommodation 23  Much current employment litigation,
however, concerns racial and sexual harassment.2 24 Although
harassment cases are sometimes analyzed as disparate treatment cas-
es, 225 this theory is often irrelevant to the nature of the case, and
220 See id. § 12111(2).
221 See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
222 Id. § 12111(9).
2 23 See BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GRossMAN, EMPLOYMENT DiscRiMiNATiON LAW
13-290 (2d ed. 1983). There was considerable discussion in the 1970s of a fourth
theory recognized by Schlei and Grossman-present effects of past legal discrimina-
tion. However, the passage of time and the Court's determination in International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), that seniority systems which
disadvantage minorities may not be challenged under this theory, have relegated it
to an insignificant role. See also EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1 2075 (Apr. 1985)
(listing a fifth theory-retaliation. Although retaliation is a legal wrong under Title
VII, the theory under which the wrong is proven is disparate treatment analysis).224 See 1986-88 EEOC COMBINED ANN. REP. 18-23.
225 See, e.g., Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the
"disparate treatment [plaintiff] suffered" by being sexually harassed was based upon
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must be stretched almost beyond recognition. The disparate
treatment employment discrimination case focuses on motivation,
and is usually proven by comparative evidence. In the typical
disparate treatment case, the concern is with whether the employer
evaluated a minority or female employee or applicant differently
than it did white male employees or applicants because of the
plaintiff's race or gender.226 Harassment cases don't fit this
mode, nor the other two modes of discrimination analysis.
From Title VII's inception, the federal courts have grappled with
the problem of on-the-job harassment. Beginning with racial
harassment cases in the early 1970s, and increasingly in the 1980s
(largely in sexual harassment cases) they have developed a doctrine
of unlawful harassment premised on settled principles of negligence
law. These cases, unlike disparate treatment cases, focus not on
comparisons, but instead on the nature of the harmful conduct:
Was it unwelcome? Was it pervasive? Was it hostile? Was the
perception of it as hostile unreasonable? Was it known to the
employer? The development of a doctrine of harassment as
unlawful discrimination, along with the doctrine of liability for the
failure to accommodate differences, provides substantial support for
the recognition of negligent employment discrimination.
1. Racial and Ethnic Harassment
It was in the area of racial and ethnic harassment that the
proposition first arose that Title VII created affirmative duties for
employers, rather than simply prohibiting them from engaging in
acts of discrimination. In a series of administrative decisions in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, the EEOC began to articulate the nature
of this duty. In the first of these cases, the Commission was asked
to determine whether there was reasonable cause to believe the Act
had been violated where an employer fired a black employee for his
inability "to get along with" his white co-employees, who had
her gender, and therefore violated Title VII); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.
55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that the supervisor of a female employee who was fired
because she rebuked his sexual advances violated Title VII because his behavior was
directed at women only, constituting disparate treatment based on gender).
226 An early sexual harassment case was sufficiently concerned with the role of
comparative evidence to note that if the harasser was a bisexual supervisor who made
sexual demands on all subordinate employees without regard for their gender, his
actions would be outside the scope of the Act. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55. But
see Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 n.7. This concern has not surfaced in later cases.
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subjected him to racial insults.22 7 The Commission found cause,
determining that the "[e]mployer is required to maintain a working
environment free of racial intimidation-by positive action where
necessary."
228
A series of opinions in accord followed. Where a white
employee was fired after he complained about racial harassment of
black co-employees, the Commission explained that the employer
was "obliged under this Act to maintain a working atmosphere free
of racial intimidation or insult. Failure to take steps reasonably
calculated to maintain such an atmosphere violates the Act."
229
Where a supervisor used racial epithets in referring to a black
employee, the Commission ruled: "Title VII requires an employer
to maintain a working environment free of racial intimidation. That
requirement includes positive action where positive action is
necessary to redress or eliminate employee intimidation."
2 0
Where an employer was charged with "tolerating" an atmosphere in
which ethnic and racial "jokes" were told, the Commission conclud-
ed "that the Company's failure to take reasonable steps to eliminate
such actions or to remedy their effects discriminates against
Charging Parties and other Negroes and Spanish surnamed
Americans because of their race and national origin."
231
These early opinions established that Title VII created at least
three related affirmative duties in the area of harassment. Employ-
ers are required to: (1) establish and maintain a workplace free of
harassment; (2) take steps to eliminate harassment when it occurs;
and (3) take steps to redress or remedy harassment when it occurs.
Although the Commission did not use the language of negligence,
the core concept of a negligent breach of a duty created by a special
relationship was present. Employers were expected to prevent racial
harassment from infecting the workplace. They were expected to
be careful, vigilant, and protective of minority employees in
confronting harassment when it occurred. Liability would be
27 See EEOC Dec. No. YSF 9-108 (June 26,1969), 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 1 6030.
228 Id.
2 EEOC Dec. No. 71-969 (Dec. 24, 1970), 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 1 6193.
230 EEOC Dec. No. 72-0779 (Dec. 30, 1971), 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 1 6321.
231 EEOC Dec. No. 72-1561 (May 12, 1972), 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 1 1354; see
also EEOC Dec. No. 74 05 (July 13, 1973), 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 834, 852
(1974); EEOC Dec. No. CL 68-12-431EU, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 295, 295
(1971) (finding violation when employer tolerated "Polish" jokes and other
harassment directed at foreign-born employees, and noting that participation by co-
employee of Polish descent was "unremarkable").
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imposed when the employer failed to comply with the standard of
care established by the statutory prohibition on discrimination,
either by failing to establish a harassment-free workplace, or by
failing to respond appropriately when harassment occurred.
Viewing the employers' obligations in this manner leads to the
conclusion that racial harassment is a wrong prohibited by Title VII
even in the absence of a specific employment decision, such as a
termination. To be harassed because of race is to be deprived of
the right to a harassment-free workplace.
This view of harassment as a different kind of Title VII violation
received further support from the first reported appellate decision
to discuss Title VII liability for on the job harassment, Rogers v.
EEOC.232 Plaintiff Josephine Chavez was terminated from her job
with an optical service owned by Rogers. She filed a complaint with
the EEOC alleging that her supervisor told her she was being fired
not because of her work performance, but because abusive behavior
by Anglo employees directed at her had created friction in the
workplace; she further alleged that the employer had segregated its
customers by race. The EEOC sought discovery from the employer,
who argued that Chavez' second claim was not actionable. The
district court agreed with the employer, denying any discovery
related to the segregation of clients.2 3 The Fifth Circuit re-
versed.
In the lead opinion, Judge Goldberg explained that the
complaint described two forms of harassment-the harassment by
the co-employees and the harassment caused by being subjected to
the racial segregation of customers. On whether racial harassment
violated Title VII, Judge Goldberg reasoned:
[P]sychological as well as economic fringes [benefits] are statutori-
ly entitled to protection from employer abuse, and... [Title VII]
sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a
working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial
discrimination.... One can readily envision working environ-
ments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers, and... Title VII was aimed at the eradication of
such noxious practices.2
34
232 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). The Supreme
Court identified Rogers as the first Title VII harassment case in Meritor Say. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986).
233 See Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422, 425-26 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
2m Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
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Judge Goldberg's reasoning gave further support to the EEOC view
that Title VII liability could be based on an employer's obligation to
maintain a workplace free of harassment. If the purpose of Title
VII was "the eradication of such noxious practices," the employer's
mere failure to prevent the practices, resulting in "a working
environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimina-
tion,"2 35 was itself sufficient to impose liability. Although not fully
articulated in Rogers, the principle found in the EEOC administra-
tive decisions and supported by Rogers is that an employer has an
affirmative duty to prevent discrimination or harassment from
"polluting" the work environment. A breach of that duty resulting
in employees being harassed based on their protected status
establishes employer liability. Here again, while the word negli-
gence is not used, the statute establishes a standard of reasonable
care-a duty to protect employees from racial slurs, abuse, or other
harassment.
As additional racial harassment cases were brought, further
reasoning from negligence law found its way into the law of on-the-
job harassment. The earliest cases were concerned with actual
employment decisions in which the harassment somehow contribut-
ed to an adverse decision, rather than itself being the actionable
conduct. In Rogers, for example, Ms. Chavez's action was filed
because of her termination, not because of the harassment.23 6 But
the question soon arose whether harassment itself was actionable,
even in the absence of an adverse employment decision. This
problem can arise when an employee who is being harassed remains
on the job, or when a court concludes that an employee who has
been terminated was harassed while on the job, but that the
termination was not linked to the harassment and was not itself
unlawful. A number of early decisions extended the Rogers
reasoning that harassment accompanied by no economic damages
was nonetheless actionable.
237
235 Id.
256 See id. at 236; see also United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631-35
(W.D.N.Y. 1978) (concluding that existence of co-employee racial harassment and
failure of police commissioner to take strong stand against harassment support
finding of pattern and practice of discrimination), modified and aff'd, 633 F.2d 643 (2d
Cir. 1980); Muray v. American Standard, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 716, 717 (E.D. La.)
(holding that harassment may be used as evidence that the plaintiff's termination was
motivated by racial bias), affd, 488 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1973).
237 See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-62 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
(deciding that verbal religious harassment violates Title VII; despite absence of
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Other early cases confronted the question of employer liability
for co-employee harassment. They generally held that such
harassment, if not known to management, was outside the scope of
the Act.23 8 In essence, these courts concluded that there was no
violation of the employer's duty to protect its employees from
harassment because the duty was triggered by knowledge of a need
to act. Thus, the courts were willing to impose liability for co-
employee harassment where the employer knew of the harassment
and took no steps or insufficient steps to eliminate it, or where the
employer had constructive knowledge, in that it should have known
of the harassment.23 9  An employer that knew of harassment
negligently breached its duty by failing to act, and an employer that
should have known of the harassment negligently breached its duty
to protect its employees and to establish and maintain a workplace
free of harassment. In the face of harassment sufficiently pervasive
that a reasonably protective employer would have known of the
problem, lack of knowledge could not be a defense. As one court
explained in the related context of an employer's failure to
investigate the bonafides of a complaint against a black worker by
a racist white co-worker:
adverse employment action or economic damages, employee is nonetheless entitled
to nominal damages); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 7 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 710, 748 (W.D. Okla. 1973) (finding independent violation of Title
VII where employer "allow[s] its hiring or supervisory personnel to refer to [minority
employees] in a manner derogatory to their race or national origin"); cf. Gray v.
Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (agreeing that current
employees have standing to bring action alleging discrimination in hiring because
resulting workforce will have an impact on the work environment and Title VII
"grants an employee the right to 'a working environment free of racial intimidation'"
(quoting EEOC Decision No. 74-84 (Feb. 8, 1975), 1975 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 1 6450)).
238 See, e.g., Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603, 606-07 (S.D.
Ohio 1975) (distinguishing employer discrimination from employee prejudice and
finding no employer liability where employee shows disrespect to co-employees);
Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177, 1186-87 (W.D. Pa. 1973)
(finding no liability where employer is ignorant of harassment and responds with
corrective measures when informed of incidents).
2
3
9 See EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 386 (D.
Minn. 1980) (holding that employer is liable for co-employee racial harassment if it
knew or should have known of harassment because employer "has a responsibility to
take reasonable affirmative steps to eliminate such incidents"); ef. Firefighters Inst. for
Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977) (concluding
that where white employees operate supper clubs on city property from which black
employees are excluded, employer must act to prevent the co-employee discrimina-
tion), cert. denied sub nom. Banta v. U.S., 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
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Though in reason and justice no employer can be held to answer
for the personal mental intent of its employees to resort to racial
prejudice; it must, however, stand answerable for notice of racial
mistreatment when allowing an unfair discharge to result. When
warning of the possible existence of such an anathema arises, it is
not exonerating excuse from participating fault to wash ones [sic]
hands like Pilate and simultaneously bleat of piety.
240
Another negligence concept to appear in the racial harassment
cases was the problem of contributory fault. In DeGrace v.
Rumsfeld 241 the plaintiff, a black firefighter harassed by white co-
employees, was terminated for absenteeism when he refused, out of
fear, to return to work. In articulating a test for liability, the court
held that the termination was unlawful if the fire department
supervisors had failed to take adequate steps to correct and/or
prevent the harassment and if the plaintiff had acted "reasonably"
in explaining why he was not coming to work and in his cooperation
with the investigation. 242 Even in the face of proven harassment,
liability would not be imposed if the plaintiff, through his unreason-
able actions, had caused the termination.
None of these racial harassment decisions focused on an intent
to discriminate by either the harasser or the employer. The
employer's liability was based not on an intent to do wrong but
rather on a failure to do right. While the harassers' intent to
intimidate was apparently assumed in at least some of the deci-
sions, 243 it was generally not discussed. Given that most of the
harassment consisted of the use of racial and ethnic slurs in the
presence of, but not directed at, the minority employees, it is
hypothetically possible that in at least some cases there was no
intent to cause harm to the minority employees, but rather a
complete disregard for their well-being.2 44 In some cases that
disregard for the rights of others may have been sufficiently reckless
to constitute an intentional wrong, but in others it may have been
nothing more than a negligent infliction of emotional distress. The
distinction was not drawn out in the cases, and the courts appeared
240 Anderson v. Methodist-Evangelical Hosp., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 33,
35 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
241 614 F.2d 796 (1st Cir. 1980).
242 See id. at 804-07.
243 See id. at 800; Anderson, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 36.
244 See e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 14345 (1982) (arguing
that racial insults, "except perhaps those that are overheard," are intentional).
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to implicitly recognize that regardless of whether there was an
intent to cause harm, the workplace was no longer free of harass-
ment, and causing that harm was wrongful. Thus, not only were
employers vicariously liable for intentional wrongful acts by their
employees, but where their employees caused harm through
insensitivity, poor judgment, and disregard for the rights of others,
they would also be found vicariously liable.
In sum, the law of racial harassment which developed during the
late 1960s and the 1970s was essentially based on the core concepts
of negligence. Liability was imposed on employers not for discrimi-
natory employment decisions but for failing to protect their
employees from harassment by supervisors or co-employees.
Liability was assessed without regard for comparisons between
minority and majority group employees, without regard for the
intent of the employers in permitting the harassment to occur,
without regard for the intent of the harasser, and without regard for
the statistical impact of such harassment on the workforce.
245
2. Sexual Harassment
The law of sexual harassment in employment followed a rockier
path than that of racial and ethnic harassment. Early sexual
harassment cases uniformly rejected the proposition that sexual
harassment was actionable under Title VII. These early cases
focused on the sex rather than the harassment, and generally
declared sexual harassment a "private" matter outside the scope of
the Act. But a series of circuit court opinions in the late 1970s and
a set of EEOC Guidelines promulgated in 1980 changed the
direction of sexual harassment analysis. As sexual harassment was
recognized as a violation of Title VII, the scope of liability estab-
lished under the racial and ethnic harassment cases for an employ-
er's failure to act to prevent harassment was expanded. This
expansion was accompanied by a new focus on whether the
employee contributed to, or caused, the harassment. Contributory
fault, in practice if not in name, came under consideration. Tort
law's privilege of consent 246 was often an issue in litigation, as
courts grappled with whether a sexual act directed at an employee
was demonstrably unwanted. The question of whether conduct was
245 No reported decision found by the author considered harassment as a neutral
practice with a discriminatory effect.
246 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 49-62, 892-892C (1977).
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properly termed harassment was subjected to a classic negligence
reasonableness test, with two circuits adopting a "reasonable
woman" test to analyze whether a victim was reasonable in feeling
harassed.
24 7
The developing law of sexual harassment has contributed to the
development of negligent discrimination in a number of areas. It
has helped define those employer duties which, if breached, will
constitute negligence. It has clarified the role of traditional
respondeat superior liability in the field of employment discrimina-
tion law. It has elevated the importance of a reasonableness test in
assessing whether conduct is discriminatory, and has provided the
basis for a "reasonable woman" test or "reasonable discrimination
victim" test in assessing employer (and co-employee) conduct.
These developments will be discussed in this subsection.
a. Early Sexual Harassment Cases
Recognition of what conduct constituted racial harassment was
relatively straightforward. While some conduct was judged
insufficiently offensive or pervasive to constitute harassnient,
248
it was generally easy to recognize racial slurs, threats, and disparage-
ments as unwanted and offensive. The question became more
complicated when the problem of sexual harassment was consid-
ered. Subjecting women to sexual slurs, intimidation, threats and
disparagement is readily analogous to the kind of racial harassment
the courts were becoming accustomed to, but conditioning
employment on sexual demands, harassment through sexual
advances, and harassment through suggestive physical touching had
no ready analogy in existing employment discrimination law.
Moreover, sexual advances could not necessarily be presumed to be
247 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of
Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990); see also infra text accompanying notes 297-
302.
248 See e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 87-88
(8th Cir. 1977) (holding that occasional references to plaintiff as a "dago" and to
Italian Americans as the "Mafia" were insufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title
VII); Kishaba v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 737 F. Supp. 549, 555 (D. Haw. 1990) (finding
that no hostile work environment existed where plaintiff failed to establish any
"objective" racially offensive conduct directed at herself or occurring in her presence),
aSf'd, 936 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1991); Robertson v. Georgia Dep't of Corrections, 725
F. Supp. 533, 538-39 (S.D. Ga. 1989) (concluding that plaintiff's allegation, without
supporting evidence, that he was removed to an inferior office because of his race
and subjected to isolated racial slurs was insufficient to create a hostile work
environment).
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unwanted in the way that virtually all racially charged conduct
could.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, a number of cases involving such
conduct were brought attempting to apply and expand the law of
racial harassment to the problem of sexual harassment. In most of
these early cases the district courts viewed the conduct as wrongful
and potentially tortious, but as lying outside the proper scope of
Title VII.
The first reported decision considering the question of whether
sexual harassment violates Title VII was in 1975 in Come v. Bausch
& Lomb, Inc.249 The case concerned two women who had suffered
verbal and physical sexual advances from their supervisor leading to
their constructive discharge. The district court dismissed the action,
holding that the harassment was not conducted as part of a
company policy, but rather as a "personal proclivity, peculiarity or
mannerism ... satisfying a personal urge"250 and that if such
conduct was actionable there would be a "potential federal lawsuit
every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented
advances toward another."251 While not using the terminology of
vicarious liability for tortious acts by employees, the opinion relies
on the familiar tort concept that an employer is not liable for an
employee's "frolic and detour."
252
Similarly, in Barnes v. Train253 an employee's job was eliminat-
ed after she refused to have sex with her supervisor. The district
courtjudge ruled that the conduct was outside the scope of the Act:
"Regardless of how inexcusable the conduct of [the plaintiff's]
supervisor might have been, it does not evidence an arbitrary
barrier to continued employment based on [plaintiffs] sex."254
In Miller v. Bank of America255 an employee was promised a better
job if she had sex with her supervisor. She refused and was
terminated. The district court dismissed her action because the
employer had a policy against sexual advances by supervisors, and
an internal complaint procedure that she had failed to invoke.2 56
249 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
25 0 Id. at 163.
251 id.
252 KEETON ET AL., supra note 123, § 70, at 505.
253 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
254 Costle, 561 F.2d at 986 (quoting Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 124).
255 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
256 See id. at 235-36.
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Again in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. 257 the plaintiff
refused her supervisor's sexual advances. She alleged that in
retaliation she was transferred, subjected to unwarranted disciplin-
ary layoffs, threats of demotion and pay cuts, and ultimately fired.
The Tomkins Court dismissed the action, agreeing with the district
court decisions in Come, Barnes, and Miller.
The abuse of authority by supervisors of either sex for personal
purposes is an unhappy and recurrent feature of our social
experience. Such conduct is frequently illegal under the penal
statutes of the relevantjurisdiction. Such conduct might well give
rise to a civil action in tort. It is not, however, sex discrimination
within the meaning of Title VII even when the purpose is sexu-
al.... If the plaintiff's view were to prevail, no superior could,
prudently, attempt to open a social dialogue with any subordinate
of either sex. An invitation to dinner could become an invitation
to a federal lawsuit if a once harmonious relationship turned sour
at some later time. And if an inebriated approach by a supervisor
to a subordinate at the office Christmas party could form the basis
of a federal lawsuit for sex discrimination if a promotion or a raise
is later denied to the subordinate, we would need 4,000 federal
trial judges instead of some 400.258
Thus, by the end of 1976 the likelihood of success in the effort to
include sexual harassment within the purview of Title VII seemed
gloomy.
However, one 1976 decision did find sexual harassment covered
by Title VII, and from that point the tide began to turn. In Williams
v. Saxbe,259 Judge Richey of the District Court for the District of
Columbia rejected the arguments of the United States Department
of Justice that sexual harassment was outside the scope of the Act.
Williams had been fired from her position at theJustice Department
on an allegation of poor work performance. She brought a Title VII
claim, alleging that the true motive for her termination was
retaliation for refusing her supervisor's sexual advances. The court
treated the claim as gender discrimination in that male employees
were not being subjected to retaliation for refusing the sexual
advances of supervisors, and thus within the ambit of Title VII.
2 60
27 422 F. Supp 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
258 Id. at 556-57 (footnotes omitted).
29 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (reversing on procedural grounds), on remand, Williams v. Civiletti,
487 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D.D.C. 1980) (finding violation of Title VII).
260 See Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 657-58 ("[T]he conduct of the plaintiff's supervisor
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By 1977 the tide had turned fully. First, the Fourth Circuit,
reviewing an unpublished district court decision, ruled that "an
employer policy or acquiescence in a practice of compelling female
employees to submit to sexual advances of their male supervisors"
violates Title VII. 261 Then the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed Barnes.262 The court reasoned that the decision to elimi-
nate Ms. Barnes' job was sex discrimination if it was motivated by
her refusing to submit to her supervisor's sexual demands, because
the demands were gender specific. The court noted that her
supervisor was not exacting such demands from male employees:
But for her womanhood, from aught that appears, her participa-
tion in sexual activity would never have been solicited. To say,
then, that she was victimized in her employment simply because
she declined the invitation is to ignore the asserted fact that she
was invited only because she was a woman subordinate to the
inviter in the hierarchy of agency personnel. Put another way, she
became the target of her superior's sexual desires because she was
a woman, and was asked to bow to his demands as the price for
holding herjob. The circumstance imparting high visibility to the
role of gender in the affair is that no male employee was suscepti-
ble to such an approach by appellant's supervisor.
263
The Tomkins decision was reversed soon after Barnes. The Third
Circuit concluded that the supervisor's sexual demands constituted
a "term or condition of employment" under Title VII; where the
employer, directly or vicariously, imposed different terms or
conditions on women than men, the Act was violated:
[W]e conclude that Title VII is violated when a supervisor, with the
actual or constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual
advances or demands toward a subordinate employee and
conditions that employee's job status-evaluation, continued
employment, promotion, or other aspects of career development-
on a favorable response to those advances or demands, and the
employer does not take prompt and appropriate remedial action
after acquiring such knowledge.
264
created an artificial barrier to employment which was placed before one gender and
not the other.").
261 Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam).
262 See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
263 Id. at 990 (footnotes omitted).
264 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3rd Cir.
1977), revjg 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976).
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The Miller decision followed.26 5 Thus, by the end of 1979 four
circuits-the District of Columbia, Third, Fourth and Ninth-were in
agreement that at least in the case of employment decisions
conditioned on supervisorial sexual demands, sexual harassment,
like racial harassment, violated Title VII.
b. The 1980 EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment
In 1980 the EEOC stepped assertively into the fray over whether
sexual harassment violated Title VII, and what kinds of conduct
constituted sexual harassment. The Commission issued Guidelines
supplementing its previously promulgated Guidelines on Discrimina-
tion Because of Sex.266 The Commission followed the reasoning
of the four circuits which had already held that supervisorial
demands for participation in sexual activity constituted a violation
of Title VII. But the Commission went much further, including
provisions which took critical steps toward the development of a
theory of negligent discrimination.
267
The Commission's Guidelines articulated three alternative forms
of sexual harassment. The first form was harassment by condition-
ing employment on the submission to sexual demands.268  The
classic example is the supervisor's refusal to hire a subordinate
employee unless she has sex with him. The second was harassment
in the form of basing employment decisions on the submission to
or rejection of sexual demands. 269  A typical example is the
employee rejected for a promotion, or terminated, because she
refused to have sex with her supervisor, as in Come, Miller, Barnes,
Tomkins, and Williams. Both of these forms of harassment are
linked to a specific employment decision in which the employee or
applicant loses a tangible job benefit because of an unacceptable
sexual demand. Because they involve a demand for sex in exchange
for employment, they are collectively referred to as quid pro quo
sexual harassment.
265 See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'g 418 F. Supp. 233
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
266 Initial Interim Guidelines appeared at 45 Fed. Reg. 25,025 (1980). Following
minor amendments, the final Guidelines appeared at 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991)).
267 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3), (d), (e), (f) (1991); infra text accompanying notes
270-79.
268 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1).
269 See id. § 1604.11(a)(2).
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The Commission also included in its definition of harassment a
third type of activity not linked to any direct employment decision.
Sexual harassment was also defined to include unwelcome sexual
conduct which "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfer-
ing with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or offensive working environment." 270 This "hostile
working environment" theory of harassment, suggested by the racial
harassment cases following Judge Goldberg's opinion in Rogers,
opened the door to determinations of sexual harassment liability
when no specific employment decision was challenged.
2 7 '
To the extent that a hostile work environment resulted from
conduct perpetrated by agents and supervisory employees, the
Commission's view was that liability should be imposed without
regard to an employer's direct knowledge, even when the employer
had forbidden such behavior; the act of the agent was deemed the
act of the principal.2 72 This view was an extension of the princi-
ples expressed in endorsing employer liability for supervisorial quid
pro quo sexual harassment in Miller v. Bank of America.273 In
Miller, the Ninth Circuit considered the role of respondeat superior
in the context of employer liability for sexual harassment by a
supervisor. The court stated:
The doctrine of respondeat superior has long been routinely
applied in the law of torts. It would be shocking to most of us if
a court should hold, for example, that a taxi company is not liable
for injuries to a pedestrian caused by the negligence of one of its
drivers because the company has a safety training program and
strictly forbids negligent driving. Nor would the taxi company be
exonerated even if the taxi driver, in the course of his employ-
ment, became enraged at ajaywalking pedestrian and intentionally
ran him down.
Title VII and § 1981 define wrongs that are a type of tort, for
which an employer may be liable. There is nothing in either act
which even hints at a congressional intention that the employer is
270 Id. § 1604.11(a)(3).
271 The firstjudicial citation to the theory is found in Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec.
& Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977) (decided on other grounds). The
theory was advanced by Tomkins' court appointed counsel, Professor Nadine Taub
of Rutgers Law School's Women's Rights Litigation Clinic. The theory has been
extensively discussed by Catharine MacKinnon. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 40-47 (1979) (describing the facts of
several cases involving hostile working environment).
272 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
275 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979).
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not to be liable if one of its employees, acting in the course of his
employment, commits the tort. Such a rule would create an
enormous loophole in the statutes. Most employers today are
corporate bodies or quasi-corporate ones such as partnerships.
None of any size, including sole proprietorships, can function
without employees. The usual rule, that an employer is liable for
the torts of its employees, acting in the course of their employ-
ment, seems to us to be just as appropriate here as in other cases,
at least where, as here, the actor is the supervisor of the wronged
employee.
2 74
In the area of supervisorial harassment, the Commission adopted
the Miller view and extended it from quid pro quo to hostile work
environment harassment.
Having broadly defined harassment, the Commission adopted
the view suggested by Judge Goldberg in Rogers that co-employee
harassment, even if unauthorized, could establish employer liability
for discrimination. 275  The Guidelines provided that "[w]ith
respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is
responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where
the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or
should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took
immediate and appropriate corrective action."276 Moreover, the
Commission stated that "[ain employer may also be responsible for
the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual harassment of
employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct
and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action."
277
Thus, liability could be premised merely on the employer's passive
failure to act to protect an employee, once it is known (or construc-
tively known) that the employee is being harassed.
This assessment of liability for a passive failure to act to protect
those whose protection is required, is a classic example of special
274 Id. (citation omitted).
275 See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,238-39 (5th Cir. 1971) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 232-38), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 952 (1972); see also EEOC v.
Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381,386 (D. Minn. 1980) (discussed
supra text accompanying note 239); cf. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of
Saint Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir.) (holding that where white employees
operate supper clubs from which black employees are excluded, employer must act
to prevent the co-employee discrimination), cert. denied sub nom. Banta v. U.S., 434
U.S. 819 (1977).
276 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
277 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e).
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relationship negligence. The wrongful conduct is not the disparate
treatment of males and females as in a McDonnell Douglas analy-
sis27 but rather is the failure to comply with the standard of care
created by the statutory duty to affirmatively take corrective action
to protect employees from harassment from customers or fellow
employees.
Finally, the Commission helped shape the standard of care
outside the context of corrective action. The Commission stated:
An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual
harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the
subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to
raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and developing
methods to sensitize all concerned.
27 9
Therefore, although the employer's obligation to take corrective
action in the case of nonsupervisorial harassment begins only upon
constructive or actual notice that harassment is occurring, the
failure to take preventative steps provides another potential basis
for negligence-type liability.
In sum, the Guidelines promulgated by the EEOC provide an
extensive basis for negligence type liability where an employer fails
to act to protect its employees from sexual harassment, either by
failing to prevent its occurrence or by failing to take corrective steps
once it occurs.
c. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
In 1986, the Guidelines came before the Supreme Court in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.280 Given the Rehnquist Court's
general hostility toward an expansive reading of civil rights statutes,
the broad reading the Guidelines give to sexual harassment law, and
the Court's decisions to disregard the EEOC Guidelines on other
occasions, 281 there was good reason to expect the Vinson Court to
disavow the Guidelines. Instead, it largely embraced them, and in
278 See supra text accompanying notes 117-23.
27'9 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0.
280 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
281 The Court has shown no reluctance to disregard the EEOC Guidelines when
it disagrees with them. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-45
(1976) (declining to follow EEOC pregnancy discrimination Guidelines); Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973) (declining to follow EEOC ancestry
discrimination Guidelines).
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so doing suggested a further willingness to move toward a negli-
gence test for discrimination.
The Vinson case involved hostile work environment harassment
by a supervisor of a subordinate employee. Ms. Vinson alleged that
after her supervisor hired her, he subjected her to a coercive sexual
relationship and various sexually charged humiliating acts. 282 The
district court found that Vinson was not the victim of sexual
harassment, reasoning in part that any sexual relationship she had
with her supervisor was unrelated to continued employment,
advancement, or promotion. 283 The court further reasoned that
even if she had been sexually harassed the bank was not liable for
the supervisor's acts because Vinson had not complained or
otherwise given notice of the harassment. 284 The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that the district
court erred in failing to apply the hostile work environment test,
and that if the supervisor engaged in sexual harassment, the
employer was strictly liable for his acts.
285
The Supreme Court completely endorsed the position of the
EEOC Guidelines that hostile work environment sexual harassment
violates Title VII:
"[U]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" ... consti-
tute[s] prohibited "sexual harassment," whether or not it is directly
linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where
"such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfer-
ing with an individuals's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
286
The gravamen of the allegation of harassment, the Court explained,
is that the sexual advances were "unwelcome."
287
Turning to the question of employer liability, the Court largely
adopted the EEOC view, but with one caveat important to the
development of negligent discrimination. The Court rejected the
282 See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60.
283 See Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980),
rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), af/'d and remanded sub nom. Mentor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
284 See id.
285 See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 147-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd and remanded
sub nom. Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
286 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting EEOC Guidlelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a),
(a)(3) (1985)).287 Id. at 68 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION
D.C. Circuit's opinion that an employer is strictly liable for all
sexual harassment by a supervisor.288 In the case of quid pro quo
harassment, when a supervisor offers or threatens the exchange of
an employment decision for the grant or refusal of a sexual act, the
Court appeared sympathetic to the argument that a strict liability
standard should apply. The Court concurred with the EEOC view
that agency principles of respondeat superior should apply;
28 9
under those principles, a supervisor making or threatening to make
decisions affecting employment status is acting with sufficient
delegated authority so that his acts may properly be imputed per se
to the employer.
290
Yet on the question of the standard for employer liability for
hostile work environment sexual harassment, the Court declined to
apply what it termed "automatic liability" or "absolute liability."
291
On this question, the EEOC's argument before the Court on how
respondeat superior operates was in conflict with the EEOC
Guidelines. The Court was asked to choose between the position of
strict liability for any agent's acts, as found in the EEOC Guidelines,
and the new position taken by the EEOC at the time of the Vinson
case. In its amicus curiae brief in Vinson, the EEOC urged the
Court to hold that when a supervisor engaged in hostile work
environment harassment outside the knowledge of the employer,
liability under principles of agency should depend on the extent to
which the employer had provided reasonable safeguards to prevent
sexual harassment and effective procedures to deal with harassment
complaints. 292  In essence, the EEOC had shifted its view of
employer liability for work environment supervisor harassment
outside the employer's knowledge toward a "reasonableness"
test.293 The Court declined to resolve this issue with a "definitive
rule," deeming it too abstract and not properly before it given the
state of the record. 294 Nonetheless, it held that employer liability
288 See id. at 72.
289 See id.
290 See id. at 70-72.
291 The Court uses both terms interchangeably. See id. at 72-73.
292 See id. at 71.
29 The Vinson Court did not reach the question of employer liability for co-
employee harassment, but Justice Rehnquist's lead opinion suggested the Court's
implicit endorsement of the EEOC Guidelines. The decision read judge Goldberg's
Rogers decision expansively to provide that an employer's discriminatory service to its
customers, if it makes the work environment hostile to its employees, violates Title
VII. See id. at 65-66.
214 See id. at 72.
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should look at least in part to principles of agency law, and that
while absolute liability for supervisorial hostile work environment
harassment is too strict, the mere existence of an anti-harassment
policy that the plaintiff failed to invoke should not bar her claim.
Hence, the Court concluded that some form of respondeat superior
vicarious liability, lower than strict liability, was appropriate.Y
5
Vinson and the EEOC Guidelines thus encouraged the develop-
ment of a negligence test for discrimination in four important ways.
First, the Court and the EEOC adopted the view that employers
have a number of affirmative duties regarding sexual harassment.
The employer has a duty to prevent ,upervisorial quid pro quo
harassment; to attempt to prevent supervisorial, co-employee and
customer hostile work environment harassment; and to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action when any harassment
occurs. The breach of any of these duties will establish liability
without proof of intent on the part of the employer to do harm.
Second, the Vinson Court and the Guidelines endorsed some form
of respondeat superior in determining an employer's liability when
its supervisors or nonsupervisorial employees pollute the work
environment through sexual harassment. This use of the traditional
tort test supports the analysis of sexual harassment cases as tort
cases. Third, the Vinson Court and the Guidelines adopted the view
that in assessing liability, an important factor is the employer's
reasonableness in acting to prevent sexual harassment from
occurring. The reliance on the traditional negligence reasonable-
ness standard suggests recognition of the development of a
negligence test. Fourth, the Vinson Court and the Guidelines
endorsed a second reasonableness test in defining what acts
constitute sexual harassment. This addresses both the question of
whether the conduct was reasonably perceived or experienced as
sexual harassment by the employee, and whether it unreasonably
interfered with the employee's ability to perform her work. Here
again, the language of tort law is invoked, requiring a balancing
approach that suggests using negligence doctrine in analyzing the
problem.
295 See id. at 73.
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d. Post-Vinson Problems
A number of the issues arising after Vinson concern these
negligence-type problems of "reasonableness." The question arises,
for example, when an employer defends a claim of harassment by
arguing that the conduct complained of does not rise to the level of
offensiveness necessary to deem it harassment. The disagreement
is not over whether the plaintiff was subjectively offended by the
conduct, but whether her taking offense was objectively reasonable
under the circumstances, or whether the alleged harasser acted
reasonably. This focus on reasonableness marks, once again, an
area in which Title VII law is merging into traditional negligence
law. The question of reasonableness is elementary to the question
of negligence. In determining whether the defendant breached his
or her duty of care, we ask whether the defendant acted as a
"reasonable person" exercising "reasonable care" would act under
like circumstances. 296 In the sexual harassment context, we now
look both to the reasonableness of the employer's acts, in prevent-
ing harassment or taking corrective action, and to the reasonable-
ness of the victim in perceiving or experiencing the acts complained
of as harassment.
One recent controversy in this area concerns what standard to
apply in determining whether the plaintiff was reasonable in taking
offense at the alleged harasser's conduct; in other words, how
should a court apply the "reasonable person" test in a sexual
harassment case? In the recent case of Ellison v. Brady, 97 the
Ninth Circuit rejected the view that reasonableness should be
296 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 123, at 173-75. Although the nomenclature has
changed from a "reasonable man" standard to a "reasonable person" standard, it is
convincingly argued by several scholars that the standard remains resolutely male.
See Leslie Bender, A Lauwyer's Primer on Feminist Theoty and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
3, 23 (1988); Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man
Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 435,
436 (1981).
297 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). A number of other courts have subsequently
adopted the Ellison "reasonable woman" standard. See, e.g., Robinson v.Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that a reasonable
woman would find the working environment at Jacksonville Shipyards abusive);
Austen v. Hawaii, 759 F. Supp. 612, 628 (D. Haw. 1991) (preferring a "reasonable
woman" standard over a male-biased reasonable person standard), aff'd, 967 F.2d 583
(9th Cir. 1992); see also Sheryl Hahn, Note, Evolution of the Hostile Workplace Claim
Under Title VII: Only Sensitive Men Need Apply, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 69,86-87
(1992) (noting the adoption of the "reasonable woman" standard in Ellison, Robinson,
and Austen and discussing its application in the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits).
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measured with reference to generally accepted notions of appropri-
ate behavior: "If we only examined whether a reasonable person
would engage in allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk
of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers
could continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory
practice was common, and victims of harassment would have no
remedy."298 The Ellison court goes on to define a "reasonable
woman" standard, explaining its necessity in sexual harassment
cases:
[W]e believe that many women share common concerns which
men do not necessarily share. For example, because women are
disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have
a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior.
Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may
understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a
prelude to violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of
sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full
appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of
violence that a woman may perceive.
In order to shield employers from having to accommodate the
idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee, we
hold that a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile
environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a
reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment.
299
By contrast, in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.3 0 the Sixth
Circuit held that the plaintiff must prove "that the defendant's
conduct would have interfered with a reasonable individual's work
performance and would have affected seriously the psychological
well-being of a reasonable employee."3 0 ' The EEOC has criticized
the Rabidue test, and proposed a reasonable victim test to determine
both whether the harassment is sufficiently severe to create an
environment hostile to a reasonable victim, and whether the
conduct is reasonably perceived as sexual.30 2 The Rabidue test
29a Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
2" Id. at 879 (footnotes and citations omitted) (citing Yates v. Avco Corp., 819
F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987)). The "reasonable woman" standard was originally proposed
in a law review Note. See Note, Sexual Harassment Claims ofAbusive Work Environment
Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. RFv. 1449, 1451 (1984).
300 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
301 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. But see id. at 626 (Keith, C.J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (dissenting opinion calling for a "reasonable victim" standard).
302 See EEOC Interpretation No. N-915-050 (Mar. 19,1990), 2 EEOC Compl. Man.
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could not be further from that of Ellison in its sensitivities, nor in
its likely impact on litigation. But the two cases share a negligence
type of approach to the problem.
Another concept from the law of negligence apparently relied
on in Rabidue is the assumption of risk defense. The rule in most
jurisdictions allows a person to voluntarily consent in advance to the
risk of befalling certain harms, either expressly or by her conduct,
thus relieving the defendant of a legal duty of conduct toward
her.3 03 In Rabidue, the plaintiff's complaint concerned a co-
employee who was "extremely vulgar and crude[,] ... customarily
made obscene comments about women generally, and, on occasion,
directed such obscenities to the plaintiff."' °4 It also involved a
number of other co-employees who displayed offensive and/or
suggestive posters of nude women in their offices.3 0 5 In deter-
mining that the plaintiffs work environment was not interfered with
sufficiently to constitute sexual harassment, one factor the majority
considered, without labeling it as such, was an assumption of risk
defense.
[T]he lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment of the
workplace both before and after the plaintiffs introduction into
its environs, coupled with the reasonable expectation of the
plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that environment [were factors
to weigh]. Thus, the presence of actionable sexual harassment
would be different depending upon ... the prevailing work
environment3 0 6
In other words, when the plaintiff accepted the position, she
assumed the risk of being subjected to offensive obscenities because
she knew that such conduct prevailed in the work environment.
The application of assumption of risk in Rabidue was criticized
in a forceful dissent,30 7 and has been further criticized by the
EEOC in an interpretive memorandum.3 0 8  Its application to
sexual harassment is disturbing in part because it deems as
(CCH) 1 3114, at 3274 (citing the dissent in Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, CJ.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
303 See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 123, at 480-98 (analyzing the many
aspects of the assumption of risk defense).
-o4 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615; see also id. at 623-24 (Keith, CJ., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
305 See id.
306 Id. at 620.
307 See id. at 626 (Keith, CJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
308 See 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1 3114, at 3274.
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acceptable, if agreed to through an assumption of risk, conduct
which has been clearly defined as violative of public policy.
Moreover, the Rabidue court did not consider whether the plaintiff,
expressly or by conduct, had actually assumed the risk. Rather, the
court seemed to hold that, as a matter of law, women assume the
risk of harassment if they choose to work in nontraditional settings
which are commonly the scene of offensive conduct. This is a
misapplication of the doctrine.
The negligence-like problem of reasonableness is also raised in
cases determining whether an employer's response to a complaint
of harassment is sufficient. The Seventh Circuit, in Brooms v. Regal
Tube Co.,30 9 held that the proper inquiry is what a reasonable
employer would do to remedy the sexual harassment. This is again
a clear negligence test. Similarly, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
require the employer to impose a remedy "reasonably calculated to
end the harassment."310 The Brooms standard was criticized by the
Ninth Circuit in Ellison, which stated it was adopting the Fourth
Circuit test.311 Whichever test is adopted, the employer is being
held liable for co-employee harassment where the employer's
wrongful conduct is merely the failure to respond sufficiently to the
harassment.
In another important application of negligence concepts to
sexual harassment law, in the wake of Vinson, the Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have embraced the EEOC Guidelines on co-
employee harassment by taking the position that employers are
liable for a mere failure to "prevent a hostile or offensive work
environment of which management-level employees knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known."3 12 Employer
liability for failure to prevent sexual harassment of its employees is
classic negligence-type liability. The employer is liable not because
it wanted the harm to occur, or helped bring about its occurrence,
but because the law imposed on it a duty of care to protect its
employees from co-employee harassment, and it failed to take the
necessary steps to protect them.
309 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir. 1989).
310 Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,256 (4th Cir. 1983); Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d
773 (9th Cir. 1992).
s11 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 n.17 (9th Cir. 1991).
312 EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Hall v.
Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 1988), and Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421-22 (7th Cir. 1986)).
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In conclusion, the developing law of sexual harassment under
Title VII has borrowed extensively from tort law, and in the process
has endorsed the concept of negligent discrimination. Employers
are held liable not because they have engaged in intentional wrongs,
but because they have failed to conform their conduct to the
standard of reasonableness required by their special relationship
with their employees, which requires them to use great care in
protecting employees from harassment.
CONCLUSION: A THEORY OF NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION
It is a fundamental tenet of our legal system that fault is not
equated with an intent to cause harm. We recognize that people
often cause substantial harm without any wrongful intent. When
the harm is caused as a result of failing to meet a minimum
standard of care, which we require to provide ourselves with a
reasonably safe and good society, we term that conduct negligence.
When employers fail to meet their obligation of due care to protect
their employees, and the public, from an undue risk of harm, they
are negligent. Duties to use due care to protect employees' health
and safety are frequently imposed by statute.313 One such duty
is the requirement imposed by Title VII to treat employees and
applicants equally, without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.3 14  Employers who, without intending harm,
breach this duty by treating women or minorities less favorably than
white men, have, in the absence of an available privilege, engaged
in negligent discrimination.
Recognition of a negligence theory of employment discrimina-
tion under Title VII permits an approach to liability in keeping with
the scientific data on discrimination. In a Title VII negligence
action, the central question is whether the employer violated its
statutory duty to treat minorities and women as it treats white male
employees, 15 or, where a higher duty has been established by the
applicable statute, such as a duty of accommodation, to treat them
as is required under the higher standard of care.
3 16
" See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1988 & Supp. II 1990) (mandating promulgation of occupational safety and health
standards for businesses).
314 See supra note 1.
315 See supra text accompanying note 226.
316 See supra Part II.C.
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It is well established that an employer may be liable under Title
VII because of its failure to recognize that its selection devices,
although facially neutral, are causing a discriminatory impact on
minorities or women. 17 Such liability is premised on the doc-
trine of negligence. Because Title VII requires the employer to
examine its selection devices to assure a lack of discriminatory
impact, the failure to do so, if harm is caused, is negligent.
Similarly, where an employer recognizes that its facially neutral
selection device is having a discriminatory impact, yet fails to take
corrective action, it is again negligent.318 In requiring employers
to take all reasonable steps to mitigate discriminatory selection
devices, Title VII imposes negligence liability for this failure to act
to prevent harm.
It is well established that where Title VII requires an employer
to take special steps to accommodate differences among employees,
it is liable when it fails in its duty of accommodation. Such liability
is premised on the doctrine of negligence. When an employer is
requested to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious
beliefs, liability is imposed if it fails to do so, regardless of its state
of mind, or its sympathy or hostility towards the employee's
religion.3 19 Liability is based on Title VII's affirmative duty to
act, which may be violated by the employer's negligent failure either
to act at all, or to act sufficiently to meet its legal duties. Similar
negligence liability is imposed under the Americans with Disabilities
Act when an employer fails to accommodate an employee's or
applicant's disability. 2 ° Under California law, an employer's
failure to accommodate pregnant employees by granting temporary
leave, even if it grants no temporary disability leave to male
employees, violates the employer's statutory duties.3 21 Liability
in such cases is not premised on an intended wrong, but on negli-
gence, the mere breach of a duty imposed by society for the general
good.
Although less well established, it should be clear that where an
employer makes decisions based on racial, ethnic, or sex-based
stereotypes, instead of making an individualized determination, it
has violated Title VII.3 22 The violation may be explained based
317 See supra Part II.A.1.
318 See supra Part II.B.1.
319 See supra Part II.C.1.
320 See supra Part II.C.3.
321 See supra text accompanying notes 211-14.
s2 Proof that the employer relied on stereotypes may in some cases require
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on a theory of constructive or inferred intent, but this intent is a
mere legal fiction. The decision may have been made without any
conscious intent to discriminate; it does not matter. Because Title
VII bans such differences in treatment, the failure to judge each
person on his or her merits is wrongful. Here again, the imposition
of liability is premised on negligence; the employer has breached its
duty to treat its employees and applicants alike, without regard to
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
It is well established that where an employer creates or main-
tains a workplace in which racial or sexual harassment is permitted
to interfere with working conditions, the employer is liable for its
failure to protect its employees. 323 Here too, such liability is
premised on the doctrine of negligence; the law imposes on the
employer a series of duties regarding on-the-job harassment, the
breach of which is actionable. If complaints are made against
supervisors, co-employees, or customers, the failure to investigate
and take corrective measures is negligence. Where an employer
knows, or ought to know, that an employee is being improperly
harassed, it is negligent in failing to take corrective steps.3 24 Where
a supervisor directly harasses an employee, but fails to recognize
that his actions constitute harassment, if a reasonable victim would
experience it as such, the employer is liable for negligent harass-
ment.
325
From these well recognized instances of negligence liability
under Title VII, it is but a small step to a general application of the
principle. Whenever an employer fails to act to prevent discrimina-
tion which it knows, or should know, is occurring, which it expects
to occur, or which it should expect to occur, it should be held
negligent. Liability should also be recognized when an employer
breaches the statutorily established standard of care by making
expert testimony regarding the prevalence of certain stereotypes. Relying on studies
such as those described in Part I.B, supra, a psychologist or sociologist could testify
to the existence of specific stereotypes; thejudge orjury could determine whether the
stereotypes were applied in evaluating the plaintiff. In other circumstances, ajudge
or lay jury may be fully capable of recognizing the stereotype applied and discerning
its application without assistance. As Justice Brennan noted in Price Waterhouse, it
does not "require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed
'interpersonal skills' can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick,
perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the
criticism." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989).
323 See supra Part II.C.
324 See supra Part II.D.
32 See supra Part I.D.
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employment decisions which have a discriminatory effect, without
first scrutinizing its processes, searching for less discriminatory
alternatives, and examining its own motives for evidence of
stereotyping.
When a woman or minority job applicant is rejected, the
rejection should act as a triggering device, requiring the decision
maker to instantly stop and examine his or her own motives. If the
decision cannot be justified with a reasonable, nondiscriminatory
reason, such as bona fide qualifications, the decision may have been
negligently reached. If a prohibited basis for decision making
played a role in the decision,3 26 consciously or unconsciously,
Title VII liability should be imposed.
Where an employer has created job screening procedures which
fail to correct for unconscious discrimination, and such discrimina-
tion influences the process, the employer ought to be subject to
negligence liability. The same standard should apply to employee
evaluations, where stereotypes can easily influence subjective
evaluations critical to job or career advancement. Similarly, when
a female or minority employee is disciplined, the employer ought to
take particular care in determining that the decision to impose
discipline, and the level of discipline imposed, has not been
improperly influenced by discrimination. Where unconscious
motivations abound, self-conscious and cautious procedures are
necessary.
One social benefit of negligent discrimination stems from the
recognition that a finding of liability should not be equated with a
determination of moral wrongfulness. In many areas of life our
society has recognized the fact that basically "good" people
sometimes do "bad" things. We may condemn the act of speeding,
for example, and hold the speeder responsible for any injuries
caused by the act of speeding, without stigmatizing the speeder as
a person. Speeding may be a generally bad thing to do, but
speeders are not necessarily bad people. If the speeder is in an
accident, we may hold her responsible for the damages caused, even
if she meant no harm; indeed, even if she did not intend to speed.
The driver who fails to see the speed limit sign and, while driving
faster than the posted limit, is involved in an injury-causing
326 In determining how much of a role discrimination must play to establish
liability, see PaulJ. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation ofAction and the Mixed
Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEx. L. REv. 17, 18-21 (1991)
(discussing standard of proof in Title VII cases).
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accident, may be held negligent per se, and thus liable for any
resulting injuries. The lack of moral blameworthiness does not
translate into a lack of legal responsibility.
Similarly, negligent discrimination need not and ought not to be
viewed as morally reprehensible conduct. Employers are confronted
daily with many difficult decisions. Even the best will inadvertently
fail to exercise due care on occasion, and the winds of chance will
cause some breaches to cause harm. When losses occur, the legal
system determines where they must fall. In the case of negligent
discrimination, actual losses suffered by the employee or applicant
should be imposed on the employer, not to punish the employer but
to compensate the employee.
Another social benefit of negligent discrimination is its likely
impact on employment policies. Imposing negligence liability
should have the effect of encouraging greater care, and discourag-
ing those who would look the other way and deny apparent
discrimination. Such a consequence is certainly desirable. Prudent
employers facing potential negligent discrimination claims are likely
to redouble efforts to affirmatively prevent improper harassment
and discrimination.
From the employee or applicant's point of view, negligent
discrimination cases may be both somewhat easier to prove, and
somewhat less satisfying to win. Discrimination litigation today is
a modern morality play, focused on the evil motives of the employ-
er. Proving an intentional discriminatory motivation is more
difficult than proving a mere failure to have thought critically
before acting, but the successful plaintiff is vindicated with a
determination that the wrong she suffered was no accident, it was
intentional. Given the difficulty of bringing such cases,3 27 vindica-
tion is no small matter. A finding of negligence will carry less moral
weight, and less stigma for the employer. Such findings, however,
are more likely to occur.
Assessing negligence liability also, importantly, places the focus
on the discrimination, not the motivation. The effect will be to
validate the harm of discrimination as harm worthy of compensa-
tion. This benefits both employees, whose suffering is being
recognized, and employers, who are no longer being accused of
-27 See Steven A. Holmes, Workers Find It Tough Going FilingLawsuits overJob Bias,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 24, 1991, at Al (late ed.) (reporting the unwillingness of lawyers to
represent plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases because of the difficulty of
proof and the diminishing likelihood of success).
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bigotry. Negligent discrimination directs its attention toward
healing the wounded, rather than assessing blame.
Where truly intentional discrimination occurs, courts should
continue to assess liability under an intentional discrimination
standard. In these cases a moral stigma will attach, and punitive
damages will generally be appropriate. Such damages are available
in unlimited amounts in race discrimination cases,3 28 and in
amounts up to $50,000 to $300,000 (depending on the size of the
employer) 29 in sex discrimination cases, in addition to the right
to recover back pay, costs and attorney fees. The award of punitive
damages is not appropriate without a finding of intent.
For over twenty years, the courts have looked at employment
discrimination as a problem of conscious, intentional wrong-doing.
Cases involving employer discrimination because of unconscious,
but wrongful, motivation, were either dismissed, or squeezed
uncomfortably into an intentional tort analysis. In the latter
instances, negligence doctrine was frequently utilized, but never
explicitly recognized. At best, the result was confusion. At worst,
it was the wrongful dismissal of cases in which discrimination was
established, but not properly pigeonholed. The time is past due to
explicitly recognize that much employment discrimination is the
product of employer negligence. Negligent discrimination should
be recognized as a central doctrine in the analysis of employment
discrimination cases.
328 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West Supp. 1992).
329 See id. § 1981a(b)(3).
